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I. The general context for preventing conflict of interest at local 
level 
 
The beginning of 2003 in Romania was marked by legislative and political reforms 
that aimed creating the necessary tools as well as the appropriate rules to better 
address the corruption phenomenon. First months of 2003 have announced new 
bills to be soon issued in order to generate a complex remedy for the already 
increased corruption flagellum. In the same time, civil society has closely watched 
these steps and immediately raised questions regarding the Government 
approach to the issue.  Civil society representatives have complained about the 
insufficient transparency in preparing the new legislation as well as about the 
adoption procedure that hasn’t allowed any debate on the provisions. 
 
Several analysts claimed that it was already very late and that the reform process 
should be speeded, the policy makers should more determine to issue the 
necessary legislation along with the necessary implementation methodology that 
was expected to generate a real application of the law. Even the most skeptical 
analysts have agreed that complex reforms are required, that in the absence of a 
proper regulation, corruption growing will soon dramatically affect all other major 
aspects of the economy and public institutions consolidation process. This 
complex effort is expected to equally involve all side politicians as well as the civil 
society. The topic of Romania issuing laws without necessary finding the right 
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tools to implement them and still missing the proper mechanisms to evaluate their 
impact is no longer unknown, important international reports underlining this 
weakness Romania needs to improve. 
 
Everybody agreeing on the opportunity, the real question was the definition of the 
concepts, a proper understanding of its complexity and of its correlations with 
other sectors.  
 
The current report has been drafted while the Government and other political 
parties were accelerating the legislative drafting process. With some exceptions, 
formally, the civil society was very little, if not at all, involved in the consultations 
before the new legislation being adopted.  
 
Still the independent experts have constantly publicly communicated their 
observations on the Government anti-corruption strategy (in this context, the 
strategy means the new legislation that we have mentioned earlier in the report), 
offering concrete and constructive suggestions on how to improve. The 
conclusions of the study include some references about the political debate on the 
anti - corruption legislation and a summary of the civil society concerns.  
 
Whenever possible, the experts had consultations with policy makers, in which 
context they mentioned the preliminary findings of the research as well as the  
European recommendations on the topic of corruption and more specifically, on 
the local public administration conflict of interest - which remained the experts’ 
primary area of documentation. 
 
There is no doubt that one big problem is generated by the still existing confusion 
about what conflict of interest means and what would be the area of application. 
Some interviewees have said it only refers to patrimonial goods, other have 
underlined that it could naturally be enlarged until including non-patrimonial effects 
for themselves, relatives, friends; for political parties or coalitions they belong to.  
 
While drafting the current report and interviewing politicians and experts, the 
coordinators have learnt at least 10 definitions, many interlocutors associating the 
conflict of interest with incompatibilities while others, on the contrary, describing a 
quite narrow vision about what the conflict of interest imply, obviously excluding 
the relations that exist between conflict of interest and transparent decision making 
process, a professional public institution personnel selection and management, 
etc.  
 
This is why, we believe that reminding the Council of Europe definition on the 
conflict of interest could be a useful contribution not only to the report but, even 
more important, to the future debates on the topic in Romania: 
 
“Conflict of interest arises from a situation in which the public official has a private 
interest which is such as to influence, or appear to influence, the impartial and 
objective performance of his or her official duties. The public official’s private 
interest includes any advantage to himself or herself, to his or her family, close 
relative, friends and persons or organizations with whom he or she has or has had 
business or political relations.” (Art. 13 in the Recommendation No. R (2000) 10 of 
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the Committee of Ministers to Member States on the Code of Conduct for public 
officials).  
 
There is a common understanding that conflicts of interest have become so 
frequent, almost part of the daily conduct at all public administration level in 
Romania that, it requires further legislative regulations but mostly a strong political 
will in order to implement them and effective tools to control its application. While 
in the Capital and other big cities, mostly thanks to the journalists interest, the is a 
more articulate knowledge on the level of conflict of interest and the local political 
correlations, there is very little evidence coming from the country side, which leads 
to a poor understanding of the national dimension.  
 
The current study has been researching the conflict of interest at the local public 
administration level but, because Romania local political life can not be dissociated 
from the central government one, which remains extremely influential, some 
observations could be also applied to the national dimension of corruption.  
 
One conclusion all experts agreed with was that the flagellum of corruption (from 
which the conflict of interest is a crucial area) requires an updated legislation 
framework that will equally respond to EU standards that Romania is concerned 
with as much as to the local needs and particularities.  
 
The new legislative provisions need to constantly be aware of: 
? the already existing legislation that was very little implemented. There is no 
tradition of assessing the implementation of the law and, for that matter, 
issuing a new legislation doesn’t guarantee its application will follow. 
? a “culture” of practicing corruption at all levels and at different dimension 
that exists in Romania. A public institution member to be offered a gift has 
been a natural part of Romanians’ way of solving an issue that concerned a 
public institution. The more complicated or urgent the issue was, the more 
substantial the gift top be offered.  
? a certain temptation that policy makers at different levels were feeling to 
use the public property, public resources and/or preferential information on 
their own benefit as if it was normal to behave so. Being a wide spread 
practice, the control was practically inefficient if ever applied. Auditors are, 
in the end, regular public servants, very much aware that their gesture to 
control any leader will not possibly remain of no consequences.  
? a chief-depending philosophy in Romania public institutions, which has a 
direct impact on any regular public servant that will have something to 
report about the misconduct of his superior.  
These will be just few examples of the context and the concerns the policy makers 
are dealing with when debating upon the legislation revising.  
 
In brief, most commentaries that were expressed in the current legislative revising 
process refer to: 
a. a proper elaboration to cope with both EU recommendations and standards 
b. a coherent, articulated and also realistic set of provisions to help Romania 
democracy prevent and control the growing of corruption through 
decreasing the number of conflict of interest situations, among other 
strategies. 
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c. a secondary legislation (could that be code of rules, internal code of 
conduct) to complementary the law. The role of this secondary legislation 
will be very important as it could regulate the necessary sectorial 
particularities that one single law could miss.  
d. drafting a realistic legislation to make sure it is applicable while elaborating 
appropriate evaluation indicators that will allow an efficient legislative 
solution for the phenomenon. 
 
The debate about how to better legiferate the corruption (the conflict of interest 
included) in Romania is not yet finalized. The biggest concern though has become 
the issue of how to better implement and asses the legislation application. 
 
Apart from the Government which has mentioned that will spend all the necessary 
efforts in order to elaborate a professional monitoring methodology that could be 
applied all around the country, Romanian civic groups have expressed their 
commitment to seriously watch the next steps and monitor each phase in the law’s 
application process.  
 
It also needs to be underlined from the very beginning of the present report that, in 
Romania, the conflict of interest is not a criminal offence. The spirit of the conflict 
of interest resolution consists in solving it without penalties. This treatment can not 
discourage the perpetuation of the conflict of interest (at all levels of the public 
administration in Romania), as long as those involved are not severely punished. 
 
 
1. The structure of local government in Romania 
 
According to the Romanian Constitution, the local government (local public 
administration) is based on territorial units and operates in accordance with the 
principles of local autonomy and decentralization of public services (Romanian 
Constitution, art. 119), and also in accordance with the principles of elected 
authorities of the local public administration, of the legality and of citizens’ 
consultation for special interest problems at local level (Law no. 215/2001 on local 
public administration, art. 2 (1)). 
 
The local autonomy is the right and the effective capacity of the authorities of the 
public administration to solve and to manage public affairs, in the name and to the 
interest of the local community, (meaning all the inhabitants of the territorial 
administrative unit) while being in accordance with the law (Law no. 215/2001 on 
local public administration, art. 3 (1), 3 (4)). 
 
Local autonomy is both administrative and financial and is exerted according to 
and within the limits of the law. Local autonomy regards the organizing, 
functioning, competencies, responsibilities and resources management, which, 
according to the provision of the law, are organized by the commune (village), city 
or county.         
 
There are three types of territorial-administrative units in Romania: communes, 
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towns/municipalities, and counties. The local government in Romania has a non-
hierarchical two-level structure, with towns/municipalities and communes at the 
first level and counties (judete) at the second level. There are 41 counties 
(Bucharest is considered as a separate, the 42nd county), approximately 265 
towns and municipalities and 2686 communes (July 2001 - figures are in a 
continuous change). Upon fulfilling certain criteria, new communes were formed 
also different small communes were reunited in one single town, this 
administrative change having budgetary and political representation 
consequences.  
 
At the first level, the local government authorities are: Local Councils (deliberative 
body) and the Mayors (executive body). Both entities are elected, local council 
members on a party list system and the mayor through a direct vote.  “The Local 
Councils and Mayors shall act as autonomous administrative authorities and 
manage public affairs in communes and towns, in accordance with the law”. 
(Romanian Constitution, art. 120). 
 
At county level, an elected public body named County Council exercises the local 
government authority as deliberative body. As in the case of the local council 
members, the county council members are also elected through a party list 
system. According to the Romanian Constitution, the County Council “is the Public 
Administration authority coordinating the activity of communes and towns’ councils 
within the county boundaries, to carry out the public services of county interest”. 
(Romanian Constitution, art. 121). Law no. 215/2002 also stipulates the existence 
of the executive body of the County Council, which is the President of the County 
Council. The President is elected by the members of the County Council from its 
membership. 
Managing a county is not only the responsibility of the county elected officials but 
also of the Government appointed representatives - the Prefect. In accordance 
with the above-mentioned territorial division in Romania, there are 42 appointed 
Prefects, their main responsibility being to supervise the legality of the local acts. 
 
The capital city (Bucharest Municipality) is organized in 6 administrative-territorial 
subdivisions, respectively sectors (districts). Each district has a mayor and a vice-
mayor, and the Bucharest Municipality has a General Mayor and 2 vice-mayors. 
 
2. Position, roles and functions of the members of the elected bodies, local 
government employees and senior local government officials 
 
Local Councils are formed by councilors elected at town/municipality or commune 
level by equal, universal, secret and free vote, through the on party electoral 
system, in the conditions provided by the Law on local elections no. 70/1991 with 
subsequent amendments. The mayors are also directly elected at 
town/municipality or commune level. The mayor is assisted by 1 (if the community 
is small) or 2 vice-mayors, elected from the members of the local council . Each 
vice-mayor has separate responsibilities; these responsibilities are decided along 
with the mayor and according to the local needs. One of the vice-mayors will 
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replace the mayor whenever this one is not there. A better definition (eventually a 
better explained roles in the legislation) has been constantly underlined by 
independent experts and political parties. Some latest proposals suggest that the 
local council should be the one deciding the separate, distinctive responsibilities 
between the two mayors. Equivalent propositions were issued for the county 
councils’ vice-presidents. 
 
The technical apparatus (employees) of the local councils are managed by a 
Secretary having the status of civil servants. The employees of the Local Councils, 
until certain level, have also the status of civil servants. The rest of the employees 
work for the local authority based on contractual agreements between the two 
parties. They are not public servants, but have to follow the provisions of the 
internal code of rules the institution they are part of, has in place.  
 
Local councils have general responsibilities regarding all matters of local interest, 
such as:  
- approving the local socio-economic development programs 
- setting local taxes and duties 
- supervising the local public services, transport and infrastructure, public 
health, public schooling 
 
- administrating the markets  
- elaborating the urban development programs 
- planning the land use 
- supervising the work of the local educational and youth services 
- ensuring the necessary opportunities for scientific, cultural, artistic, sports 
and recreation activities 
- coordinating the parks’ maintenance 
- coordinating the environment protection along with the conservation the 
preservation of historic monuments 
- assisting the implementation of the social protection 
- ensuring the maintenance of public order 
- coordinating the external relations of the respective community. 
The role of the local council is to drat the legal background and issue the 
necessary decisions, the mayor have to implement. 
 
In his position as the most directly community connected local authority and also 
as the executive branch of the local public authority, the mayor has to draft the 
local budget and present it to the local council seeking for approval. Once the 
proposed budget accepted, the mayor is hold responsible for its implementation; 
technically, it means he is the main local credit coordinator.  
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Also, the mayor is responsible for: 
- preventing and limiting the damages of disasters, catastrophes, fires, 
epidemics etc, in cooperation with the specialized institutions of the 
State; 
- ensuring the public order through the police, gendarmerie, public 
guardians, fire fighting department, etc. 
- controlling the hygiene of public places and food products sold to the 
population; 
- adopting the necessary decisions for the drafting of the urban 
development programs, and pass it  to the local council for its 
approval; 
- ensuring the management of social housing based on the local council 
decisions; 
- running the local public services; 
- issuing authorizations and  licenses, and concluding contracts that are 
of its competence according to the law; 
- accomplishing the duty of performing marriages. 
 
In brief, while the local council is the deliberative body, the mayor is responsible of 
implementing the decisions, thus becoming the major authority who is held 
accountable by the local community. Although the responsibilities between the 
mayor and the local council are legally well divided, the real responsible for issuing 
and implementing the local policies is the mayor. Mayor versus local council 
cohabitance is influenced by a number of factors among which the most important 
could be: the direct vote for the mayor which holds him accountable to his 
community more than the local council whose members are elected on a party list; 
the different political affiliation of the mayor than the majority of the local council’s, 
the personality of the mayor who finds very hard to obey in front of the local 
council, etc.   
 
County Council is formed by elected councilors; its activity is coordinated by a 
President and two vice-presidents elected from the county councilors. A county 
Secretary General, who has the status of civil servant, manages the technical 
apparatus (employees) of the County Council. The employees of the County 
Council have also the status of civil servants. 
 
The distribution of roles at the county level is similar to the one previously 
described at the local leve l. As very clear suggested by the verbs, the county 
councils mostly approve and coordinate.  
 
County councils have the following main responsibilities: 
- adopting strategies and programs of economic and social development of 
the county; 
 9 
- approving the internal rules of operation and the personnel scheme of the 
City Council and public services subordinated to the City Council; 
- adopting strategies and programs of economic and social development of 
the county; 
- coordinating the activity of local councils within the boundaries of the 
respective county, to ensure the provision of services relevant at the county 
level; 
- approving the county budget, credits and taxes and decide distribution of 
funds to towns and communes;  
- administrating the public and private domain of the county; 
- deciding on concession, rental, or selling of public and private domain of the 
county. 
 
The President of a county council is the one who represents the interests of a 
county, being the authority in charge of county budget drafting and 
implementation, after being approved by the county level. He is the technical staff 
supervisor, accountable to county council, while being responsible for 
implementing the budgetary policy at county level. The role of the President is 
essential in the relation between the county level and the very local one (commune 
or city). He is the main responsible in distributing the equalization funds to local 
communities within the respective county.  
 
Although the institution of the Prefect is not strictly speaking a part of the local 
public administration but an executive body representing the Government at the 
county level, it is important to mention it in this context, at least for two main 
reasons. The role and responsibilities of the Prefect make it closely interconnected 
with the operations and decision-making process of the local public administration. 
In each county, it is the Prefect responsibility to supervise the legality of the local 
decisions. The role of the prefect is important in this context since he has the legal 
option to take to the administrative court the decisions of the local or county 
councils, or decisions of the mayor or of the county council President, in case that 
it considers questionable the legality of those acts.   A Prefect is appointed by the  
Romanian Government in every county and in the Bucharest Municipality, as the 
representative of the Government at the local level and the leader of the 
decentralized public services of the ministries and other executive central bodies 
from the administrative-territorial units  
 
The Prefect has the following main functions and roles: 
- ensures the fulfillment  of the national interest, the application and respect 
of the Constitution, of the laws and of all Governmental decrees and 
ordinances, of all the other normative acts; 
-  ensures  the public order and safety; takes measures for preventing 
criminality and for the protection of the citizens’ rights; 
- exercises the control regarding the legality of the administrative decisions - 
adopted or issued by local or county authorities and the ones of mayors or 
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of the county council president, except for the ones related to their current 
management  
- ensures the preparations and oversees the accomplishment of the non-
military defense and civil protection measures 
 
The Prefect annually reports to the Government about the accomplishment of its 
duties in accordance with the Government program and objectives. Besides 
annual reporting, the Prefect should answer any question from the central 
Government that refers to his mandate in the territory. There is no relation of 
subordination between prefects and county councils, local councils or mayors. 
Although it is not among the objectives of the present report to research the real 
role and performance of the prefect in the territory, it could be interesting to 
mention that his responsibilities were recently questioned by different opposition 
parties’ members. It the current public servants reform Romania is going through 
these days, these parties have asked the Government to change the status of the 
Prefect in making him a public servant. Prefect was considered as a particular 
case, and was so far excluded from the whole debate on the status of the civil 
servants. Other proposals were even more “revolutionary” in the sense that 
opposition parties have required that the current Prefect responsibility in 
controlling the legality of the local administrative decisions to be delegated to the 
county councils. 
A part from the local elected and appointed officials, the local public administration 
is relying upon a professional executive body. The Law no. 188/1999 1999 on the 
status of civil servants regulates the main executive positions’ responsibilities. This 
Law provides a classification of the offices that should be held by civil servants in 
the local government. It is important to note that the law differentiates between the 
servants invested with a public authority and the rest of the staff members (such 
as secretaries, maintenance personnel, drivers, etc). Only the first category is 
subject of the Law no. 188/1999. Referring to the local public administration, the 
law precisely stipulates the list of positions assimilated with the status of civil 
servants, as follows. 
 
A. Senior civil servant positions: 
 - County/Bucharest Municipality secretary  
 - Municipality/Bucharest sector/Town/Commune secretary 
 - Head of department 
 - Chief Architect 
 - General Director / Deputy General Director 
 - Director / Deputy Director 
 - Chief Financial Clerk 
 - Head of Service 
 - Head of Office. 
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B. Regular civil service positions:  
 - Adviser 
 - Expert 
 - Specialized Inspector 
 - Legal counselor 
 - Auditor 
 - Specialized referent 
 - Inspector 
 - Referent. 
 
These positions should concern all local communities in Romania. They are the 
technical staff of the local public administration, appointed based on professional 
criteria. The professionalization of the administrative staff is one of the most 
important current debates in Romania, their role in improving the local community 
development through a better local services delivery quality being constantly 
underlined. The reform aiming to create a strong professional body of civil 
servants in the Romania has started and will remain an ongoing process, leading 
to a continuous  preparation of the personnel . Although they are not appointed 
based on political criteria, they are accountable to their hierarchical supervisors 
often representing different political parties.  
 
According to the Romania legislation, the technical staff activity should not depend 
on political changes, although in same cases (directly depending on political 
stakes) high level positions (directors, personal advisors) are potentially subject of 
change depending on the political affiliation of the institution new leader.  
 
As already underlined by important international institutions as well as by domestic 
think tanks, one of the most problematic aspects that Romania has to deal with 
today is not necessary the absence of the legislation (although some areas, in the 
local public administration domain included, could be further regulated) but its real 
implementation. Provisions are many times vague enough to leave space for 
interpretation, which ultimately leads to the non-implementation of the law. In 
relation with the growing number of legislative abuses, many citizens have 
complained about the legislative incoherence and insufficient law enforcement. 
The following chart exemplifies this statement. 
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a small part of it/almost no part a big part of it/the majority do not know/do not answer
 
Chart 1. Do you think that in Romania... 
Source: Open Society Foundation, Romania. Public Opinion Barometer, October 2002 
 
3. Evidence on the scale of the conflict of interest problems in the country 
 
As conflict of interest is closely related to the general phenomenon of corruption, 
statistical data about the magnitude of corruption can be considered as relevant 
background information to conflict of interest. In the last Corruption Perception 
Index conducted by Transparency International1 in 2002, Romania scored 2.6 (on 
a 0-10 scale) and ranked 77th out of 102 surveyed countries.  
 
Another major data source regarding corruption perception and practices in 
Romania is the EBRD/World Bank 1999 Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey (BEEPS). The 1999 BEEPS assessed Romania as the only 
EU candidate country affected by both high “state capture” and high 
“administrative corruption”. “State capture” is a theoretical concept that designates 
“the efforts of firms to shape and influence the underlying rules of the game (i.e. 
legislation, laws, rules, and decrees) through private payments to public officials”2, 
while “administrative corruption” applies to “the illicit payments required from the 
firm in the (oft-distorted and arbitrary) implementation of existing regulations, 
policies and laws 3”. 
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In the year of 2000, the Romanian Government commissioned the World Bank to 
produce a Diagnostic Survey of Corruption in Romania, a research that produced 
the most comprehensive corruption-related data set in Romania so far.  
38%
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41%
50%
44%
70%
67%
Public officials Enterprises Households
Encounters with bribery Think that bribery is part of everyday life
Think that all or almost all public officials are corrupt
 
Chart 2. Overall corruption: perceptions and experiences 
Note: Encounters with bribery means percentage of respondents who encountered bribery 
in previous 12 months 
Source: World Bank, Diagnostic Surveys of Corruption in Romania, 2001 
 
Although a significant amount of information relevant to corruption was gathered in 
the last three years, there is no statistical data available as regards specifically the 
perceptions or experiences of the general public with the conflict of interest in the 
Romanian administration. Still, some statistical information about recent public 
perception on corruption phenomenon in Romania could be interesting in this 
context. 
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Chart 3. What is the main reason of corruption in Romania?  
(two choices, cumulative answers) 
Source: Open Society Foundation, Romania. Public Opinion Barometer, October 2002 
 
After a series of media reports, the large scale of economic conflict of interests in 
the local government was acknowledged by the Romanian Government as a major 
issue and determined it to enact in January 2002 the Emergency Ordinance no. 
5/2002 meant to introduce and strengthen prohibitions for local government 
elected officials and civil servants. This act mainly forbids commercial firms where 
the local government officials and/or civil servants are managers, significant 
shareholders, associates, administrators, and auditors to conclude services, works 
or supplies contracts with the respective local government and its subordinated 
companies.  
 
As reciprocal accusations of conflict of interest between various Romanian political 
parties became a quite common practice, the media has published several lists of 
local councilors who are in an economic conflict of interest situation, according to 
the allegations of their contenders. The lists were provided directly by the parties 
that, through their local members, managed to collect the necessary information. 
Some national newspapers also researched the topic, publishing estimations 
about how spread the economic conflict of interest has became, occasionally 
including lists of names. Still, none of the information provided by the opposition 
parties or by the media was double -checked.  
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4. Measures and initiatives taken to improve prevention of conflict of interest 
during post-communist transition 
 
Unfortunately, legislative measures against various aspects of conflict of interest  
that were considered really efficient were introduced only recent in Romania. 
Before the last two years legislative approach in dealing with the phenomenon, 
1996 - 2000 administration had had a more committees and commissions oriented 
methodology. Former President of Romania, Emil Constantinescu decided to form 
county committees and a national commission in which to deliberate the best route 
to target the corruption. The President himself took the lead of the campaign in an 
attempt to stimulate the necessary actions in the area of the public institutions. His 
vision was to bring together all segments of public administration as well as of the 
civil society and determine them to assume a more pro-active role in dealing with 
corruption at all levels. Unfortunately, this approach, although very deliberative 
oriented, lead to no concrete results.  
For instance, the Law on the status of civil servants was adopted in 1999, the Law 
on preventing and combating corruption, in 2000, the Law on Public Procurement, 
the Law on the free access to information, and the new Law on Local Government, 
in 2001. As mentioned above, an act specifically directed to economic conflict of 
interest in the local government was adopted no earlier than January 2002, 
following great public pressure and media scandals.   
 
Even though references to the relevant regulations will be made in the following 
section of the report, an overview of the present legal provisions on conflict of 
interest in the local government is necessary from the very beginning.   
 
The Law no. 215/2001 on the local public administration has two articles, which 
speak about incompatibilities at the local level.  
 
Art. 30 prohibits local council members to concomitantly hold other positions such 
as: 
- prefect or deputy prefect,  
- civil servant in local public administration (county council, prefect 
hall) and in central public administration,   
- civil servant in public services at municipal or county level, in the 
decentralized public services, 
- employee of a local public administration (in the sense that it can not 
be employed by the same public authority where he serves as an 
elected official), 
- employee of the prefect hall (in the sense that he can not serve as 
an employee in the Prefect hall of the same county)  
- manager or member of the board of directors of public utilities 
companies established by local and county councils, 
- mayor, 
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- member of Parliament, minister, 
- secretary of State, deputy secretary of State and any other 
equivalent positions. 
 
Besides the prohibitions applicable to the councilors, the mayors and vice-mayors 
are incompatible with the following positions (art. 62):  
- management positions in commercial firms where the State or the local 
government is the main shareholder and in the State -owned or public utilities 
companies, 
- any other position in a public office or activity, except teaching and positions 
in non-governmental organizations.   
 
The position of prefect is incompatible with the position of Member of Parliament, 
member of Government, mayor, local or county councilor. He cannot hold a 
professional representative job, any other public function or a professional activity 
paid by autonomous companies or by commercial companies with State or private 
capital. 
 
There is a legal term of 10 days for solving a situation of incompatibility and failing 
to do so can lead to the termination of the local elected official’ s mandate (art. 60 
and 72). The law also stipulates the obligation of the local elected officials to 
withdraw from taking part in decisions for matters in which they or their relatives up 
to the fourth degree have a patrimonial interest (art. 47). Decisions made without 
compliance with this rule are void de jure and can be attacked by any interested 
person. 
 
Some political parties have published lists with potential infringements of the 
legislation. This information was more revealing the already encountered cases 
than working towards preventing the evolution of the conflict of interest.  Media 
has followed some of these cases and covered interesting stories involving local 
political leaders. There is not constant reaction policy of the responsible 
institutions to the frequent cases presented by the media. Political parties, on their 
turn, promised intransigent political decisions in any of their local members would 
avoid the law. No such cases were encountered so far but parties were promising 
a severe evaluation before the following upcoming elections of the year 2004.  
 
A set of generic provisions relevant to the issue of conflict of interested were 
introduced in the Law no. 78/2000 on preventing and combating corruption, which 
assimilated the following actions with corruption crimes: 
- engaging in commercial transactions incompatible with one’s public 
position by using information detained by way of exerting a public office (art. 
12) 
- using confidential information or allowing access to such information to 
unauthorized third parties (art. 12). 
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Art. 4 of this law also provides for the obligation of the holders of a public office to 
declare in 30 days any direct or indirect donation and gifts received in relation with 
the exercise of their public duties, except those of a “symbolic” (minor) value. The 
text neither specifies a threshold defining the “symbolic” character of the gift, nor 
stipulates sanctions for non-compliance.  
  
The main legal framework regulating conflict of interest as regards civil servants is 
the Law no. 188/1999 on the status of civil servants. The whole Section 4 (art. 56-
57) is devoted to the prohibitions applying to civil servants, such as: 
- civil servant position is incompatible with any other public office 
engagement , except teaching 
- civil servants are not allowed to hold any position in public utilities 
companies, commercial firms or any other profit-making entities 
- civil servants are not allowed to exert any activities that have a relation 
with their official duties in privately owned companies.  
 
Civil servants have the obligation to fill in financial disclosure statements upon 
their appointment and termination of employment on a specific position. They are 
not allowed to accept any gifts or advantages upon consideration of their public 
position (art  46).  
 
The supervision of assets and financial situation of public officials and civil 
servants is regulated since the adoption the Law no. 115/1996 on financial and 
assets statements.  Public officials and civil servants are requested to fill-in the 
financial disclosure report within 15 days after the commencement of their 
term/employment and 15 days after the end of their term/employment. The 
information requested cover own financial resources and assets, financial 
resources and assets shared with spouses and financial resources and assets of 
children in their legal custody. The main shortcoming of this law resides in the non-
public character of these statements, which drastically diminishes its preventive 
role.  
 
In the year 2002 the concern for a better regulation of the conflict of interest has 
increased. Two very different draft laws on conflict of interest, one coming from the 
Government and the second from an opposition political party (National Liberal 
Party) were issued. The first is narrower in scope and covers the members and 
employees of the Executive only, while the latter is far more comprehensive, 
covering also the local government officials and employees. Although they are not 
dealing directly with conflict of interest, two other draft laws on transparency in the 
decision-making process and on disclosure of public officials’ financial and assets 
statements were also elaborated in the same time. 
 
Besides the legislative measures, in the year 2002 there were isolated political 
initiatives at the local level trying to elicit good examples of solving conflict of 
interest situations by voluntary withdrawal of councilors either from public office or 
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private business (for instance, the initiative of the opposition Democratic Party). 
The elected officials of the opposition National Peasant Christian Democratic 
Party, who voluntarily disclosed financial statements would represent another 
relevant example that parties’ leaders could be the real stimulent for implementing 
a law which, in a way, very much concerned the party existence. 
  
As a last moment development, the government, through the National Agency of 
Civil Servants intends to promote a code of conduct for the civil servants. In this 
code there are taken into consideration some of the potential conflicts of interest. It 
is the Government intention to give the Code the juridical force of a law, making it 
more important than a simple internal regulation paper. Judging from the latest 
extensive debate of the civil society on the civil servants Code of conduct, this 
domain seems to be one of the most delicate and also urgent to legiferate 
domains in the public administration reform process in Romania. Whenever talking 
about gifts and hospitality, Romanians are frequently associating these practices 
with civil servants.  When this report was almost reaching its end, the Government 
was till debating upon the necessary legislation concerning civil servants. 
Obviously, the Code was not made part pf the anti-corruption legislation the 
Government has just presented to the Parliament (March 2003). Details about the 
Government recent anti-corruption legislative approach are introduced in the 
Conclusions section of the report. In the existing context, it is expected that further 
documentation and consultations on the civil servants Code are to be implemented 
before adopting the law, harmonizing it with the newly adopted anti-corruption 
legislation.  
 
Tolerated like it was, the conflict of interest became a more and more serious 
threat to Romania still young democracy. Reaching the current scale made the 
policy makers realize that committed political and legislative actions should no 
longer be postponed. No doubt that the international reports underlining the 
current status of corruption in Romania had a concrete simulative role in speeding 
the reforms. It is obvious that the new circumstances of Romania NATO/EU 
accession have played a crucial role when the Government has announced a 
multi-level and all major domains legislative regulations.  
 
After the stage of solving the issues as they were coming, the policy makers have 
decided to prevent any escalation of the phenomenon through issuing additional 
legislation. With all the importance of such regulations being underlined, the real 
question of whether the Government would fully and non-partially implement it still 
remains. In this context, the opposition parties, the non-governmental 
organizations and the media have spoken about their future projects to monitor the 
anti-corruption legislation application, assessing the Government capacities and 
making concrete improvement recommendations whenever appropriate, also 
joining the institutions’ efforts towards preventing the future escalation of the 
conflict of interest and corruption.   
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4. The legislative map of regulations of conflict of interest in local governments: 
? Law no. 115/1996 on financial and assets statements by public officials 
? Law no. 188/1999 on the status of the civil servant (with subsequent 
amendments): art. 6, 56-58, 70, 79, 92. As secondary legislation to the Law 
no. 118/1999, there are the Government Decision no. 1083/2001 regulating 
the organization and operation of disciplinary committees within the public 
institutions, and the Government Decision no. 1087/2001 regarding the 
organization of contests and examinations in the context of civil service 
recruitment. 
? Law no. 78/2000 on preventing and combating corruption 
? Emergency Ordinance no. 60/2001 on public procurement. (Chapter X, 
Contraventions and Sanctions, art. 97-101). 
? Law no. 215/2001 on the local public administration (with subsequent 
amendments): art. 30, 60, 61, 62, 72. 
? Law no. 544/2001 on the free access to information. 
? Emergency Ordinance no. 5/2002 on the introduction of prohibitions for 
local elected officials and civil servants.   
 
Other legislation pertaining to the general framework of organization and operation 
of the local government includes the following: 
 
? Law no. 189/1998 1998 on local public finances 
? Government Ordinance no. 35/2002 for approval of the Framework of 
organization and functioning of local councils (with subsequent 
amendments) approved by Law no. 673/2002 
? Government Ordinance no. 36/2002 on local taxes and charges (with 
subsequent amendments) 
? Government Ordinance no. 53/2002 for approval of the Framework of 
organization and functioning of territorial-administrative units 
? Law no. 656/2002 on preventing and combating money laundering 
? Government Decision no. 1278/2002 for approval of methodological norms 
for enforcing GD 36/2002. 
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Representation of the main legislative provisions on conflict of interest 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Recommendations: 
1. When defining the terminology, Romania’s conflict of interest particularities 
need to be carefully assessed. Also, European recommendations as 
regards the conflict of interest regulation should be the basis for elaborating 
the national legislation. 
2. Before further regulations to be established, we suggest a thorough 
examination of the acting legislation for harmonization of different 
provisions. 
3. Solving the conflict of interest should go beyond the casual discharge of the 
official position whenever serious conflicts of interest occur.  
4. Easy-to-file complain system against all forms of conflict of interest should 
be designed and regulated to allow citizens’ intimations. 
 
Law no. 215/2001 on the local public 
administration (modified by Law 
216/2002, Law no. 738/2001, 
Emergency Ordinance no. 74/2001): 
art. 30, 60, 61, 62,  72. 
Law no. 188/1999 on the status of the 
civil servant (modified by Emergency 
Ordinances no. 82 and no. 284/2000): 
art. 6, 56-58, 70, 79, 92. 
Secondary legislation 
 
Government Decision no. 1083/2001 
regulating the organization and 
operation of disciplinary committees 
within the public institutions. 
Government Decision 
no.1087/2001 regarding the 
organization of contests and 
examinations for civil service 
recruitment 
Emergency Ordinance no. 
60/2001 on public 
procurement. (Chapter X, 
Contraventions and Sanctions, 
art. 97-101) 
 
Law no. 115/1996 on 
financial and assets 
statements by public 
officials 
 
 
Law no. 78/2000 on preventing 
and combating corruption 
 
Law no. 544/2001 on the 
free access to information 
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II. Potential sources of conflict of interest in local governments 
 
 
1. Duplication of power 
 
 
“Conflict of interest” as such is a relatively new concept in Romania as far as its 
application to the public administration is concerned (it had a larger circulation in 
the private sector and was one of the key terms in corporate governance debates). 
The concept of “incompatibility” was used instead of conflict of interest, firstly in 
the Romanian Constitution but also in other special legislation, whose 
exemplification is mentioned in this report.  
 
There are a number of incompatibilities relevant to the local public administration 
provided by the Law no. 215/2001 on local public administration. All such cases 
were detailed in the Chapter I, 4.  Besides prohibition of conflict of roles between 
elected local government and central government executive offices, the Romanian 
legislation includes other relevant provisions when it comes to incompatibilities 
with offices falling under other jurisdictions such as active military, police, judges, 
public attorney, Constitutional Court, Court of Audit etc. 
 
However, enforcement of these provisions is sometimes inadequate, as indicated 
by different examples, among which the cases of two councilors of Neamt4 and 
Suceava counties members, at the same time, of the local departments of the 
Court of Audit are relevant. Another case of poor enforcement of these prohibitions 
concerns a member of the General Council of the Bucharest Municipality, who is 
at same time a significant shareholder in an important taxi company while holding 
the position of President of the Romanian Drivers Labor Union; the conflict of 
interest became manifest when he promoted an initiative aimed at regulating the 
organization of taxi activities.  
 
Although the law prohibits the overlap between the role of a local government 
employee and member of a local elected body, the enforcement of the relevant 
provisions is rather weak. Members of the county council in Iasi county were 
mentioned in the media while they were working also as employees of the mayor’s 
office. It is very likely that such a situation is aggravated in the smaller 
communities where qualified human resources are scarce.  However this 
circumstance by no means can provide a complete explanation of these practices, 
since other situations occur in a very different environment. In Bucharest, a 
councilor of the 5th sector cumulated, in the past mandate, the position of head of 
public domain inspectors. Presently he is a Bucharest General Council member 
and head of the control department of the 6th sector mayor’s office. 
 
The conflict of roles between members of local elected bodies or senior local 
officials and civil servants at a national government agency is explicitly prohibited, 
but the unclear formulation of these provisions leaves room to attempts to avoid 
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the incompatibility. The most significant attempt of transgression was made by the 
former Prime Minister Victor Ciorbea (1996-1998), who nominally kept his position 
of elected Mayor of the Bucharest Municipality during his term of Prime Minister. 
An attempt to the justification of this situation was made based on a legal 
interpretation drawn on a specious distinction between the concurrent holding and 
the actual execution of two public offices (basically, it was claimed that only the 
simultaneous actual execution of both offices would generate a situation of 
incompatibility and that the Prime Minister would be entitled to nominally keep his 
office of mayor alongside his executive mandate while merely suspending the 
execution of his mayor duties). Even though the Prime Minister Ciorbea eventually 
resigned from his mayor office few months after elections, this decision was 
primarily determined neither by the weakness of this argument nor by the severe 
public criticism, but rather by his lacking of political support from his political party 
(National Peasant Christian Democratic Party).  
 
A special case is related to the “personal advisers” of senior public officials and 
dignitaries, whose appointment is very arbitrary, mainly based on loyalty and 
discipline. Such an example is the case of a local elected councilor who is the 
adviser of the Minister of Agriculture after holding the position of personal adviser 
of the Prime Minister Adrian Nastase. The arbitrary appointment nature of the 
already high number of personal advisers is aggravated by factors such as: the 
inexistence of precise professional criteria for their selection, their special status in 
the public administration whole personnel. In Romania, personal advisors are paid 
positions and, what is even more important, they are not assimilated to public 
servants which gives them a special status in the whole spectrum of a public 
institution personnel.  
Because these positions are often perceived as “low profiled” activities, they can 
easily shift from their original responsibilities to promoting personal interests, using 
their influence at high decision making level. 
 
Overall, there is need for a more rigorous enforcement and clarification of conflict 
of roles of the members of local elected bodies to avoid situations such as:  
- overlapping with the position of civil servant in the local government of the 
same local community  
- overlapping with the position of civil servant in the local government of 
another local community  
- overlapping with the position of civil servant of executive agencies in the 
same local community  
- overlapping with the position of civil servant of executive agencies in 
another local community. 
 
The conflict of roles of local government officials and owners of local media is one 
of the most frequent instances of conflict of interest at the local level in Romania. 
Its main consequences lead to a growing trend of concentration of media 
ownership at the county and regional level and a limitation of the freedom of 
expression of the local media in exposing corruption cases and law-breaking 
activities. Salient examples come from Constanta and Bacau counties, where 
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mayors have a major influence on the local print and/or electronic media and 
distribution channels, based on their position of owners or significant shareholders; 
there are also many other examples of a more diffuse control over media in other 
regions, indicating an implication of members of the Parliament in the same 
business with other local politically involved businessmen. The most prominent 
situation is the tendency of the local elected officials to gain and maintain a 
monopoly on the media at the local level by using their influence or their direct 
powers. 
 
As marginal the sports field might seem, there are strong reasons for considering it 
worth mentioning in the context of the conflict of interest. The position of an owner 
of sport clubs, especially in popular sports in Romania such as football, offers 
privileged means for collecting and manipulating public sympathy that can easily 
be converted into votes.  Therefore, it is not by accident that many prominent local 
elected officials and politicians are, at the same time, owners of such sport clubs 
and associations. There is no legal regulation or code of conduct in this regard 
although this issue has been acknowledged as a serious political matter5. The 
above mentioned situations are even getting the conflict of interest into a larger 
scale since there are local public funds that the local authorities are investing into 
sports-related projects. Examples come from to the local municipalities of Bacau, 
Brasov and Craiova. 
 
Along with the growing importance of the local authorities associations in 
Romania, their leading positions became very attractive for members of the central 
Government. Those valuing what these leading positions could bring (both in 
terms of visibility and access to international funds that were, in fact, highly 
allocated to such associations in the last years) were former members of the local 
public administration. They are the ones currently representing the local authorities 
needs while negotiating with the central Government whose members some of 
them actually are.  
 
  
2. Economic conflict of interest 
 
 
Accepting gifts and hospitality is a widespread practice in the Romanian local 
governments and in the public sector as a whole. City Hall as the public institution 
in charge of the most directly citizens related issues, is one of the first public 
institutions that Romanians have got used to offer gifts to. The following chart 
gives us a picture of the gifts giving practice in Romania. City Hall members 
receiving gifts is on a leading position. Also, its is interesting to observe that the 
rest of the percentages are also high which indicates the wide spread of such 
practice in Romania. 
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14%
22%
13%
49%
25% school   75%
hospital   51%
police   87%
court of law    78%
city hall    86%
no yes
 
Chart 4. During the last year, if you or a member of your family had a problem to 
be solved by a public institution, have you had to offer a gift to a member of ...  
Source: Open Society Foundation, Romania. Public Opinion Barometer, May 2001 
 
 
If talking about options, the following chart indicates that many citizens would first 
prefer to advocate the public servant so that he/she will eventually fulfill the duties 
and only later to offer a gift, if no other option.  According to the bellow chart, 
Romanians would rather complain to the hierarchic superior of an unfriendly public 
servant than to begin with offering gifts. If further analyzing the chart results, other 
indicators should not be missed, but this is not the aim of the present report.  
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50%
22%
8%
8%
1%
1%
10%
ask the civil servant to
perform his obligations
complain to civil servant
superior
offer a gift to the respective
civil servant
find a friend with
connections that could
influence the decision
manage without it
other
do not know/do not answer
 
Chart 5. What should a person do when, for a specific problem that needs an 
official approval/authorization, the civil servant keeps delaying the resolution ... 
Source: Open Society Foundation, Romania. Public Opinion Barometer, November 2001 
 
Although the Law no. 188/1999 on the status of the civil servant and the Law no. 
78/2000 on preventing and combating corruption both have introduced provisions 
against this practice, their implementation is so far rather weak. According to the 
provisions in the Law no. 188/1999, all civil servants are forbidden to directly or 
indirectly solicit or accept, for others or for themselves, any gift, which is offered in 
order to influence their public conduct. The civil servants in executive positions 
should not be directly connected to any solicitation whose resolution falls in his 
mandate.  
 
Furthermore, the Law no. 78/2000 regulates the bribery and the traffic of influence, 
stipulating that the legal punishment for the civil servants included in the Penal 
Code is more severe. 
 
The main reason for the perpetuation of this practice is the absence of a sound 
organizational culture in the public institutions, associated with the delays in the 
general reform of the Romanian public administration. This problem is also 
amplified by a cultural factor: as indicated by public opinion surveys 6, relationships 
between civil servants/public officials and citizens are not understood as 
professional ones, but assimilated to informal relationships dominated by 
obligations of reciprocity, more of citizens’ obligations towards behaving in front of 
the civil servants.  
   
Local governments elected officials and, to a smaller extent, their employees are 
frequently involved in business interests, this involvement taking various forms: 
significant shareholders, administrators, and managers of private and public 
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companies. Such involvements also include ownership of private enterprises that 
are somehow under the jurisdiction of the councils (for instance through 
association).  This overlap allows them to gain economic advantages by means of 
preferential access to inside information about public procurement and concession 
contracts or privatization deals. Although these situations are legally regulated by 
the Law no. 215/2001 in what concerns the elected officials and by the Law no. 
188/1999 in what concerns the civil servants, other supplementary regulations for 
both categories being provided by the Government Ordinance no. 5/2002 
provisions, there is no enforced mechanism for a strict oversee of the illegal 
conducts.  
 
More precisely, the Government Ordinance no. 5/2002 stipulates that no private 
enterprises whose managers, significant shareholders, associates, executive 
administrator, auditors, member of the Board of Directors, are local elected 
officials (by which we understand local councilors, county councilors, mayors of all 
community sizes, vice-mayors, presidents and vice-presidents of the county 
councils) is permitted to contract public funds. No commercial link that involves the 
local officials is permitted or any contractual agreement with the public utilities 
companies (regie autonoma). 
 
The above-mentioned provisions are also applied to civil servants and any other 
employee of the respective public administration body or subordinated public utility 
company. These same provisions are applied to the relatives of the local elected 
officials up to the second degree. It is important to emphasize, in this context, that 
the extend of the relatives degree touched by the regulations is not always 
consistent. For example, other already in place provisions referring to a local 
official who is not allowed to participate in any debate and decision from which he 
or his relatives up to the fourth degree are financially gaining, impose more severe 
obligations.  
 
There are ambiguities in the regulation of some incompatibilities: even if the 
positions of local elected officials and managers of public utilities companies (regie 
autonoma) or public services subordinated to the local council cannot be 
cumulated, this prohibition is not explicitly referring to the subordinated positions 
(such as deputy directors, technical or economic directors). According to data 
collected by the Democratic Party and National Liberal Party, at the beginning of 
2002, a number of 573 local elected officials from the ruling Social Democracy 
Party (PSD) were having business relationships with public utilities companies 
(regii autonome) or commercial companies subordinated to the local councils the 
elected officials were members of. 
 
A recent Emergency Ordinance (no. 16/2002) regulating the “public-private 
partnership” has a serious potential for engendering new forms of conflict of 
interest by stimulating the involvement of the local councils in commercial 
activities. These practices will directly affect the principles of free competition, 
leading to corrupt or politically biased allocation of resources. Most recent 
examples come from the establishment of public stores with subsidized prices 
(economate) and the national program of free distribution of “cakes and milk” in 
the public schools (a Government social initiative later described in the report).   
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There are cases when the managers of private companies that did business with 
the municipality eventually became local elected officials with the sole motivation 
of acquiring a better position for promoting their commercial interests (one relevant 
example is the manager of a lightning company who continued to exercise his 
private position after being elected in the local council). 
 
Engaging in other paid employment or paid - activities is a frequent situation that 
elected local government officials, especially county and local councilors, find 
them in. Most frequent explanation they provide is that revenues they earn from 
exercising their public responsibilities are not sufficient (as a matter of fact such a 
claim is justified because of low fees per council meeting). More worrying are the 
cases of civil servants (employees) whose economic conflict of interest of such 
type, are tolerated (for instance, city chief-architects who are, at the same time, 
employees of a construction company doing business with the municipality). In this 
last respect, the delay in the enactment of the secondary legislation related to the 
Law no. 188/1999 on the status of civil servants has very negative effects. A draft 
on civil servants Code of Conduct was recently elaborated by the National Agency 
for the Civil Servants (the political debates on the Code are not finalized yet). The 
draft was publicly debated started with the fall of 2002, its elaboration being one 
important priority since the creation of the Agency in February 2000. The Code is 
meant to complement the law and more clearly stipulating the mechanisms and 
the authorities supervising the above mentioned misconducts. 
 
Today, there are no legal restrictions on post-employment activities of a person 
who was priory representing the public institution in a transaction with a private 
company. This is a major source of conflict of interest not only for the local 
government officials but for the public sector as a whole. For instance, a local 
councilor of the Bucharest Municipality cumulating the position of director of the 
water supply public utility company (regie autonoma) has led the negotiations with 
the private company that eventually won the concession of the water supply 
services. After finalizing his public duty and resigning, the winning company hired 
him as a consultant. (Even though it is not an example taken from the local 
government, the following situation is also quite typical: a former director in the 
Ministry of Environmental Protection in charge with inspecting and evaluating the 
environmental implications of a large private mining project, becomes the director 
of the mining company short time after leaving his public office).  
 
A particular conflict of interest situation comes from sponsorships granted to 
foundations closely connected to political parties, by commercial companies, 
wining public tender contracts. The media recently brought under public scrutiny 
the case of foundations from Ialomita County, connected to the ruling party, which 
received sponsorship from a commercial firm that won the public tender for the 
governmental program “cakes and milk”, aimed at providing a free breakfast to 
students in the elementary schools. Following the media reports and political 
reactions, the Prime Minister’s Control Department has triggered a control action. 
In this example, the foundations had no direct contractual link with the local 
authority. In the same time, it should be noted that there are frequent cases in 
Romania when local authorities are subcontracting various services to NGOs with 
which successful partnerships were encountered. The evident conflict of interest 
begins when a foundation/association gains a public funds sponsored project while 
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being lead by a local official and this local official is part of the decision making 
process in what concerns the financial agreements. Under these circumstances, 
all prohibitions regarding the private companies that are managed/owned by a 
local official while gaining public funds contracts should be equally applied to non-
governmental organizations whose leaders are holding local public position in the 
same time.  
 
The role of the NGOs in the whole debate on conflict of interest is very important 
and, for that matter, it recently generated many disputes. Independent analysts 
were appreciating that parties-NGOs financial links directly affect the still fragile 
NGOs credibility in Romania. Obviously, the sometimes money driven activities of 
the non-governmental organizations, have increased the interest of local and 
national politicians in getting involved in the NGO sector. Behind noble assumed 
aims, foundations run by local politicians, very often became easier, convenient 
financial routes through which to channel funds financing different party activities. 
Donors have also become more and more interested in supervising and, of 
course, discouraging, such practices. 
 
 
3. Conflict of interest of personal relations 
 
 
While nepotism is openly accused in political discourses, there are no substantive 
mechanisms to prevent it. As a result, there are a plethora of media reports about 
relatives being employed in local government institutions under influence of public 
officials. 
 
Economic activities of spouses of the local government officials are not only a 
frequent practice, but also the best cover for the public officials who claim their 
withdrawal from business interests.  
 
Regarding the mechanisms to prevent personal association of public officials with 
clients and matters/cases under official consideration, the Law no. 215/2001 on 
the local public administration contains a provision requiring the officials to 
withdraw themselves from a debate/decision- making, if they or their relatives have 
a patrimonial interest in the matter under consideration. In fact the text is unclear 
as to the meaning of a “patrimonial interest” of local elected representatives, which 
renders it almost inapplicable to some concrete situations: while the situation of an 
individual decision (a particular concession, procurement etc) is quite clear and 
indisputable, as regards the requirement of withdrawal, this is not the case when it 
comes to deliberations of a more general nature, concerning adoption of normative  
acts. 
 
The provision states that a member of the local council cannot be involved in the 
deliberation process or be part of decision making process, if directly or through 
relatives up to the fourth degree, he has a personal interest in the matter. The 
same regulation applies if he is a part of the management team of the regie 
autonoma or a private enterprise, involved in the respective business. 
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Any local council decision that is adopted while avoiding the above mention rule, is 
subject of cancellation. It is though the Prefect role to supervise the legality of any 
local council decision, which makes him (the Prefect) the main institution in charge 
of appealing the encountered illegal decisions to the administrative sections of the 
courts (contencios administrativ). In the same time, any citizen could initiate the 
appeal.   
 
There are no systematic mechanisms to prevent preferential treatment of friends, 
colleagues and family members. The smaller the community gets, the chances of 
nepotism relations in the local public administration area are higher. Small 
communities in Romania are suffering of a very limited number of intellectuals 
among who to select the future candidates for any position in the local public 
administration or to nominate a trained, professional civil servant. Under these 
circumstances, it is very likely to find direct relatives being part of the same local 
small or even medium public administration body, mainly due to very limited 
alternatives, as well as to the little interest potential candidates might show for 
assuming a public role in the community. Unquestionably, level of salaries is 
discouraging the well prepared potential candidates who are aware they could be 
easily better paid if joining a private company, for example.   
 
On the other hand, we have to note that the smaller the community, the more 
limited number of local public elected and civil servants is required. Stressing the 
above situation, the law should not differentiate between large communities and 
smaller ones when it comes to nepotism situations.  
 
 
4. Using official information for personal profits 
 
 
Romanian authorities hardly can be described as over-disclosing information at 
their disposal. There is a prevalent culture of secrecy in the Romanian public 
sector and there still are great difficulties in the implementation of the newly 
adopted legislation on free access to information (Law no. 544/2001).  
 
We will in brief describe the main provisions of the Law no. 544, in what concerns 
the interference with the conflict of interest. The Law no. 544 stipulates that each 
public institution must organize a public communication department specialized in 
informing the citizens and conducting the public relations activity or designate a 
responsible person to organize the PR activities. Certain categories of information 
will be issued as part of the institution PR obligation (laws regulating their 
organizational structure, names and leading positions, the institution budget and 
annual report, programs or strategies, list of pub lic interest documents the 
respective institution can issue), while for the rest, any citizen should write a 
solicitation. By public information, the law understands any information, which 
refers or is resulted by the activities of a public authority or public institution. To 
any solicited information, the public institution must formulate an answer within the 
limit of 10 days with the only exception that, if the information requires a further 
documentation or systematization, the deadline could extend to 30 days 
(meanwhile, during the first 10 days, the solicitant will be informed that the 
response formulation requires an extended period). Declining to answer the 
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solicitant request, with the explanation of such decision, should be also 
communicated within 5 days upon request. It is the public institutions’ duty to hold 
monthly press conferences making sure the public is well informed. The refusal 
not to issue a legitimate question response leads to situations where the solicitant 
can appeal to the institution leader. If the solicitant is not satisfied with the internal 
mechanism of appealing, he can approach the Administrative Court (contencios 
administrativ). If his trial is successful, the Court can order the respective 
institution to issue the solicited information while covering the moral and 
patrimonial damages of the solicitant. Such trial is tax free and solved in 
emergency. Special provisions for the media access to public information are 
included, information will be provided in no more than 24 hours, unless there is 
additional justified need for further documentation, a situation that will be 
communicated to the media solicitant.  
 
Along with the adoption of the Law no. 544/2001, the whole spectrum of public 
institutions has been involved in a complex institutional reform, learning new 
techniques on how to manage the information and process it to the public. Many of 
the miss-functionalities are generated by a lack of client oriented information 
management. The opportunity created by the Law on access to public information 
made the public institutions more vulnerable to be judged by the citizens seeking 
for public information. The old culture of keeping the public information as far from 
the citizens as possible has been going through significant positive changes, to 
which many people working in the institutions have not been able to adapt. Also, 
adopting such legislation is expected to generate a change of mentality. 
 
The situation is furthermore complicated by the Law on classified information (Law 
no. 182/2002), recently passed by the Parliament, leading to difficulties for the 
public officials and civil servants in dealing with the criteria of information 
disclosure. More precisely, the law stipulates that any information whose 
disclosure could legally damage the public or private interest public person is 
categorized as office secret information. The leader of the institution is in charge of 
deciding which information is classified and which is public.  No compiling with the 
leader’s decisions in this domain has criminal consequences. It is forbidden that 
any public institution will restrain the access to any type of information that is 
aimed to ensure the public information or to information whose keeping apart from 
the public, could obstruct the legal system. 
 
In reality, many situations in which confidential information is used by senior public 
officials to attack political adversaries are encountered. Because of the incomplete 
legal framework and inapplicable control mechanisms, a public official cannot be 
efficiently supervised if providing any privileged information to interested third 
parties. Whenever reported, the misconduct was not investigated and couldn’t be 
sanctioned in any way. Withholding official information that should properly be 
released or providing false or misleading information is just a sub-variety of an 
overall still poor implementation of legislation on free access to information. The 
opacity of many local governments leaves room for channelling inside information 
about public procurement contracts or other local government decisions to 
interested third parties. 
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The adoption of the Law no. 544/2001 on access to the information of public 
interest, has not improved the access to public information did not improve in the 
last year.  According to data gathered by Transparency International Romania7, 
the year 2002 brought a generalized decrease in the answer rate and the quality of 
the public institutions’ response to information requests, irrespective of the social 
or professional sta tus of the solicitors (journalists, citizens, NGOs etc.). Still, the 
civil society campaigns aiming to improve the mechanisms of releasing public 
information, according to the new law, through not only soliciting information but 
also through following legal procedures, whenever the case, have determined 
many institutions to reform their information releasing policies. It is expected that, 
after these first steps of the law implementation, many more local institutions will 
better learn to act transparently, from the stage of deliberation to the one of 
sharing the decisions motivations. 
 
  
5. Using local government property 
 
 
There are no efficient mechanisms to prevent the unauthorized use of local 
government property for private or political purposes. According to media reports, 
this is a widespread practice, which becomes more frequent during electoral 
campaigns. In most local governments there are no technical means to control the 
use of telephone for private purposes. Automobiles and mobile electronic 
equipment are also frequently used for private and political purposes.  
 
The only legal mechanism in place is the Penal Code, which holds sufficient 
provisions to sanction the use of public property in personal interest. You can 
better say that there is a common understanding that a person holding a public 
position is going to use that advantage. The dimension of using the public property 
for the own interest (or the political party interest) is directly depending on position 
within the public administration hierarchy. This varies from situations where regular 
employees frequently use the office phone for personal use, to others who go 
shopping with the office’ car (or even asking the driver to shop for them) and finally 
the high officials traveling to seaside by State helicopter. Although all of these are 
well known, the most extravagant being highlighted in the media, no public 
punishments were recorded. 
 
It is the responsibility of the internal audit to check whether the public money is 
spent in a proper manner that serves only the community interest. In practice, very 
often, internal audit has to find legal justifications for expenditures that happen not 
to have a credible explanation. For instance, a common practice for public officials 
traveling in the country for personal interest is to explain that their trip was 
motivated by professional relations with local authorities in the city of destination. 
In some of these cases persons that are involved do not even hold a position to 
justify their trip (such as relatives or political party officials), while the supporting 
documents indicate names of eligible working for the local government.   
 
Another common situation of inappropriate use of local government property 
occurs in cases when the mayor offers various advantages such as: cars and 
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mobile phones to be used with no budget restriction, to the members of the 
council, in exchange for their “cooperation“. 
 
By a mutual tolerance of using the public property in its personal advantage, only 
the most extravagant are finally subjects of media scrutiny.  
 
 
6. Government employees’ involvement in political party activities 
 
Local government employees have the status of civil servants and, consequently 
their expressing political views or taking part in political activities in their capacity 
of public civil servants are forbidden. However, media reports show that there are 
cases of political pressure coming from the political leaders of local government 
institutions on their employees who are expected to join a specific political party. 
Sometimes, it is not really necessary that the leader will exercise any “pressure”, a 
simple recommendation for the institution members having the same impact. Even 
if joining of political parties is avoided, the local government employees are 
frequently used for partisan political purposes in the exercise of their official duties 
by their politically nominated supervisors, especially during electoral campaigns. 
However, it needs to be underlined that in many cases, it is the public servant 
decision to actively support the leader in, for example, his political activity while 
serving as a public authority. These situations very often occur whenever there is 
a long time, solid relation between the institution leader and some of the staff 
members, thus the last ones freely agreeing to practice political activity for the 
sake of their leaders’ expressed needs. These types of situations require individual 
analysis, carefully assessing all the circumstances, before drawing any conclusion. 
 
Still, in a normal situation, when a public servant is asked to perform an activity 
that is not strictly related to his job description, the person has the right to firstly 
complain and demand for not being asked to do the respective job. If the leader 
still insists, and of course - depending on the gravity of the demand - the public 
servant could complain in a written memo while still having to implement the 
respective request. These situations are more a matter of local public authority - 
individual employee relation than a national formalized operation. Other legal 
mechanisms the affected person could utilize are directly depending on the gravity 
of a situation. 
 
As mentioned above, the politically nominated supervisors show a strong 
preference for the political “homogeneity” of employees in their institutions. This 
situation becomes more obvious during electoral campaigns. It is a common 
practice that key personnel in the local administration are also members of 
campaign staff of the local candidates, a situation that leads to the frequent 
allocation of employees’ work time for electoral purposes. Also, due to their 
preferential access to public facilities, some candidates are easily relying on the 
local public administration facilities while running in the campaign. 
 
Political influence for recruitment and promotion of employees within local 
government exists but to a lesser extent than in central government institutions. 
One obvious reason is that the recruitment base at the local level (outside 
Bucharest) is quite limited, and then the number of competent professionals to be 
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employed is rather small while the public office duties become more and more 
demanding in terms of general skills and qualifications. 
 
Given that the political membership is often perceived by civil servants as a 
supplementary guarantee for stability in their office or for a promotion he is aiming 
to reach, there are cases when employees take initiative and change their political 
affiliation if such a political change at the top of the institution occurs8.   
 
It should be noted though that the Government has recently established a National 
Agency for Civil Servants whose main role is to coordinate the policies, including 
the formation of a professional civil servants body in Romania.  
 
 
Recommendations 
 
1. Creation of a national database that includes all local elected officials and civil 
servants, in order to track any duplication of power or any potential conflict of 
interest. This data should be constantly updated. 
2. Reducing the maximum number of personal advisors for each local public 
official, regulating the competence criteria when selecting the personal 
advisors. 
3. A more rigorous enforcement of the already existing regulations of the conflict 
of interest at different levels of the local public administration.       
4. Previously members of the local public administration should be forbidden to 
be employed by any of the private companies that had economic ties with their 
former activity. This restriction could be imposed for 3 to 5 years.  
5. No subordination/supervising relation should be accepted between relatives up 
to fourth degree. 
6. A better management of the confidential data through enforcing a better 
application of the Law on classified information. 
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III. Institutions and procedures of preventing and detecting 
conflict of interest 
 
 
1. Disclosure policy 
 
 
According to the Law no. 115/1996, local government officials have to fill-in 
financial disclosure statements, first when being employed and second after the 
end of their term. At the local level, the following categories fall under the 
provisions of the law: local and county councilors, mayors, civil servants, members 
of the managerial boards and other managers and directors of local public utilities 
companies which are subordinated to the local authority. There are no special 
requirements to concern the senior public officials. The same procedure is also 
mentioned in the Law 188/1999, art 46 (2). 
 
Public officials are requested to fill-in the financial disclosure report 15 days after 
the commencement of their term and 15 days after the end of their term. The 
information requested regards their financial resources and assets, the financial 
resources and assets shared with spouses and finally, the financial resources and  
assets of children in their legal custody.  
 
Civil servants and other employees (members of the managerial boards and other 
managers and directors of local public utilities companies which are subordinated 
to the local authority) submit their financial disclosure statements to the public 
authority who have hired them or to the person who was responsible for their 
appointment. Local and county councilors as well as the mayors’ statements are 
submitted to the Prefect.  
 
The law provides for a control commission formed by two judges and a prosecutor 
of the territorial Court of Appeal in charge with reviewing the financial disclosure 
statements. The members of the control commission serve for a three-year term. 
Unfortunately the commission does not act ex officio but only upon receipt of a 
request for investigation. The request for investigation can come from the chief 
prosecutor of the territorial Court of Appeal or the head of the institution where the 
person under investigation is employed. Also, the public official who is publicly 
accused of illicit acquisition wealth can submit a request for its own investigation. 
Any regular citizen, who is holding solid information, could interfere with this 
process noticing the chief prosecutor of the territorial Court of Appeal or the head 
of the institution where the person under investigation is employed about the 
presence of a public official whose property was illegally acquired. 
 
The possibility for the average citizen to request for an investigation of wealth 
remains rather minimal because the party asking for an investigation has to 
provide a solid, comprehensive list of proofs. Reading about the legal procedure, a 
regular citizen should follow, it is obvious that it could easily lead to inhibiting the 
citizen who holds information and is about to submitted to the Court because, if the 
information is not proven to be correct, the person turns into a subject of legal 
penalty. The control commission acts as an intermediary, evaluating the cases in a 
period of maximum 3 months reaching one of the following situations: 
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- sends the case further to the territorial Court of Appeal, if proves that 
strong reasons exist,  
- stops the investigation if the initial reasons proved to be artificial,  
- suspends the investigation and sends the case to the competent territorial 
District Attorney if, while the investigation was developing, other criminal 
facts were encountered.  
 
If the Court evaluation indicates that the property was illegally acquired, it decides 
to confiscate the respective goods.  
 
The biggest concern regarding the topic of financial disclosure these days is 
related to the provision that denies the public access to this information. Although 
the media and the civil society have already proved their interest in learning about 
the public officials financial disclosure documents, there is no evidence that a 
regular citizen has used the legal mechanisms described above (submitting a 
notice to the responsible authorities which later on to start an investigation). 
 
 
2. Procedures to report misconduct or suspected conflict of interest 
 
 
There is no uniform practice as to the local government employees’ obligation of 
reporting misconduct of other public officials, conflict of interest situation etc. Local 
governments and public institutions in general are reluctant to introduce in their 
internal codes or regulations any strong requirements that would exceed the scope 
of obligations provided for by law. 
 
The prefect is the public official having the legal obligation to ensure the 
implementation of the law and consequently to suspend a local elected official who 
finds himself in a situation of incompatibility.  
 
The Law no. 544/2001 on the free access to information states that information 
which covers an illegality cannot be legitimately classified as secret; consequently, 
any person disclosing such information cannot be accused of publishing 
secret/confidential information. Although the law on civil servants and the Labor 
Code include regulations about the abusive dismissals, there are no specific 
mechanisms to encourage the information disclosure practices while protecting 
and protect the respective person, if accusations occur. Under the current 
economic and political circumstances in Romania, the decision of disclosing 
information that is interpreted as illegal, jeopardizes the professional career and 
his position in the respective institution.   
 
Still, it has to be mentioned that both the Law no. 188/1999 on the status of the 
civil servant and the Labor Code provide general protection against abusive 
dismissal. Again, like in many previous mentioned situations, the issue is not the 
absence of a legal framework but its enforcement.  
 
Finally, it is the responsibility of each public institution (at all levels) to organize its 
management in the best efficient - oriented manner.  While elaborating the current 
report, experts have learnt that there were institutions in Romania, which 
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elaborated their own internal procedures for their employees in order to report any 
evident conflict of interest. Such practices opened a new chapter in the whole 
debate about corruption and ways to prevent it. Experts have also learnt that many 
employees’ reaction to these procedures were not encouraging in the sense that 
their perception was more of betraying their colleagues, a perception which, in 
fact, would be impossible to explain if looking back at the communism mentality 
and working environment. Self-consciousness is a concept that needs to be further 
analyzed and explained together with a future better understanding of policies to 
help decreasing corruption. 
 
The general public can make use of the general complaints mechanism, which are 
in place in each public institution in Romania. There are no special procedures the 
public should follow if to expose conflict of interest situations. Following recent 
public debate on the issue of conflict of interest and corruption, there are isolated 
initiatives of some mayors, such as “hot lines” citizens can use to report officials’ 
misconduct9. Given the voluntary nature of these initiatives, there is no guarantee 
regarding their continuity. Also, the anonymous reports are easy to be ignored by 
control institutions whose investigations need proofs.  
 
As an alternative to individual direct exposure, under the conditions of anonymity, 
it happened that representatives of public institutions approach the media whose 
investigations were building the case.  
 
 
3. Other measures assisting prevention of conflict of interests 
 
 
Redress against administrative decisions is provided by means of administrative 
sections of the courts of law (contencios administrativ).  Any person aggrieved in 
his legitimate right by an administrative act or failure by a public authority to solve 
his application within the legal term is entitled to the acknowledgement of his right, 
annulment of the act, and remedies for the damage. 
 
The Law no. 29/1990 on administrative litigation and Civil Code Procedures 
stipulate that appeals against administrative decisions can be filled to the 
Administrative Litigation Sections of the county court or Bucharest’s. Appeals can 
be filed to the Administrative Litigation Section of Appeal Court. The Courts can 
nullify administrative decisions, order adoption or amendment of an administrative 
act and decide on compensations for damages. The Law no. 29/1990 does not 
provide the citizens with an effective mean to appeal decisions of the public 
administration. The most part of appeals reviewed by the Administrative Litigation 
Sections are filed by the prefects who attack decisions of the local or county 
councils or by the mayors who on their turn, attack the prefects’ decisions. At the 
present time, a draft law on Administrative Litigation that would give citizens more 
rights to appeal administrative decisions is under discussion in the Parliament. 
 
The Prefect can appeal any decision of the local administration, if he/she 
considers it illegal (public appeal). Any private individual (citizen or legal entity) 
can appeal a decision of the local administration that he/she considers that brings 
direct damages to him/her.  
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There is no systematic practice of risk assessment of the areas susceptible to 
misconduct and conflict of interest, except general conclusions that can be drawn 
from social inquiry instruments such as the World Bank’s Diagnostic Survey of 
Corruption in Romania. The last report dates in 2000 is an opinion-based survey 
that allows for an identification of sectors where corruption incidents reportedly 
occurred more often. Unfortunately, the scope of the survey was very large and 
the local government system was treated as a whole, making a sub-sectorial 
assessment very difficult. 
 
In fact, the Law no. 215/2001 on the local public administration states that a local 
elected official who has a “patrimonial interest” in the matter under discussion, 
either directly or through relatives, is under obligation to withdraw from the related 
deliberations and decision-making process.  If this occurs, the respective decision 
can be appealed in the Administrative Litigations Section. 
 
Large proportions of companies winning public contracts are those with important 
officials from the local government among their shareholders. Many public officials 
do not even hide the fact that they work, at the same time, as private managers or 
consultants of local companies doing business with the municipality. They very 
naturally, justify their business preoccupations as a financial deserved 
appreciation for their skills, funds that are very gracefully completing their modest 
salaries in the public administration. 
 
The case of the municipal councilors in Bucharest was the most salient in this 
respect. However, it is important for the accuracy of this report to remind that the 
official legal ground for the recent suspension of the Council was not related to 
conflict of interest but a procedural one (six successive decisions of the Council 
being invalidated in Court). According to information released by the Public 
Administration Ministry10 in February 2002, a total number of 123 local elected 
officials were registered as connected with private commercial companies that 
have business relations with the local public administration in all parts of Romania. 
According to the same report, as a result of the Ordinance no. 5/2002 enactment, 
in general, the official concern lead to the following steps for eliminating the 
existing conflict of interest situations: 
- 24 have resigned from their public office positions 
- 88 have resigned from their positions held in the private commercial 
firms. 
At the same time, 11 contracts have been cancelled.   
 
Also, as already mentioned earlier in the report, the opposition parties’ lists 
including names of the ruling party local officials financial agreements with the 
public money or in managerial positions in the local public utilities companies, 
offered new data to better picture the dimension of this phenomenon in Romania 
(573 cases registered all around the country at the level of the beginning of 2002).   
 
Hardly enough for the political parties leadership who is aware that businessmen 
represent important “asset” for a party budget, recent statements indicated that 
leaders have asked their local representatives to choose between politics and 
business, in an effort to prevent the corruption growing. 
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One important aspect in this context refers to transparent auctions. Learning that 
personal friendships easily mean a business already half-owned in Romania, more 
emphasis was put on the importance of legal, transparent public auctions. 
According to the Emergency Ordinance no. 60/2001 on public procurement, 
bidders who can be proven to have been involved in corrupt or fraudulent 
practices related to the procedure for the contract in question must be excluded.  
 
However it is unclear how such a provision can be effectively implemented as long 
as the law does not provide any procedure of blacklisting the companies. The 
procedure mentioned above applies only to corrupt practices related to the 
contract in question, which leaves room for that company to participate in other 
tender in the future, organized either by the same or another local government.  
 
In order to sum up all major legal provisions that concern our topic, we will mention 
in the end, that local governments do not play a significant role in the privatization 
field. The Law no. 219/1998 on the regime of concessions, which does not 
stipulate any provisions concerning conflict of interest, regulates the concession 
agreements.  
 
 
4. Measures used by human resource management to prevent conflict of interests 
 
 
General rules for personnel recruitment and promotion procedures are provided by 
the Law no. 188/1999 on the status of civil servants supplemented with the 
Government Decision no. 1087/2001 on the organization of contests and 
examinations for public office employment. This Government Decision states that 
the recruitment process should comply with the principles of open competition, 
merit-based selection, and transparency of contest organization, equal 
opportunities, and confidentiality of personal data (Art. 1). According to the 
Government Decision no. 1087/2001, the National Agency for Civil Servants is 
responsible for the methodological coordination, monitoring, control, 
implementation and compliance with the selection procedures by public authorities 
(art. 55). According to the National Agency for Civil Servants, whenever a 
vacancy, the “affected” local public institution has to follow a clear procedure. First 
step is to let the NACS know that a vacancy has occurred so that this central 
institution in charge will consult its database in order to identify potential skilled 
replacements. Its searching findings will be issued within the limit of 15 days. 
Besides the in-between two institutions consultations during the process, the 
National Agency has a major role to actually supervising the selection procedures. 
If the vacancy concerns a leadership position, NACS has to delegate is 
representative to be part of the selection committee. For the rest of the regular 
vacant positions, NACS is together deciding with the involved institution about the 
opportunity and possibility of delegating a representative to be part in the 
committee and therefore of the selection process. If no such participation is 
possible (although according to the National Agency, very rare the Agency 
declined its participation), the “affected institution” has the immediate obligation of 
informing the National Agency about the process and the results. However, it 
becomes the obligation of the NACS to actively involve in any complain solving, 
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whenever occurs. The local institution decides the selections questions and 
procedures as well as the opportunity of involving Labor Ministry expertise.  
 
A general framework for the evaluation and promotion of civil servants has been 
prepared by the National Agency for Civil Servants. At the present time, promotion 
procedures are based on the application of a professional evaluation grid, some of 
the criteria in the evaluation grid being described as leaving room for not so 
uniform or even arbitrary practices, independent experts say.  
 
According to the Law no. 188/1999 on the status of civil servants, the recruitment 
and promotion of government employees must be based on merit and professional 
competence that are to be judged by means of a standard evaluation procedure. 
With few exceptions, the rules regarding openness of selection procedures are 
generally observed. The Government Decision no. 1084/2001 introduced the 
standard methodology for evaluating the individual professional performance. The 
employees have the right to contest the evaluation if considered unfair. Each 
institution has the autonomy of self-evaluating its employees, closely running 
consultations with experts from other national institutions (as it frequently does 
involving the Labor Ministry experts). If any public servant’s complain occurs, the 
National Agency is participating in the resolution process.   
 
The strictness of national monitoring of the selection process decreases according 
to the size of local governments. One very important but also problematic step 
regards the public announcement of the vacant positions so any interested part 
will learn and apply.  “Public locations” had various meanings for different 
institutions/persons. By on purposely posting the announcements in area difficult 
to access, the citizens’ access to information was hampered.   
 
There are cases when publicizing vacant positions in a public location is 
interpreted in a manner that hampers access to that information, if intention to “fix” 
the selection procedure exists.   
 
With some degree of autonomy, it is very clear that the local public institutions in 
Romania need to constantly consult with the national institutions in charge, both 
when to hire new personnel as well as when to evaluate their performance. The 
National Agency for Civil Servants will then offer consultancy and assistance for a 
good human resources management, very soon in conjunction with the public 
training institution whose role in the on going preparation of the public servants 
and officials is expected to increase. 
 
 
5. External and internal control supporting the prevention of conflict of interest in 
local public administration 
 
 
Exercising control in Romania involves a variety of actors, from ministries’ 
specialized control departments, Ministry of Finances included, to local or/and 
internal specialized units in the local public administration. There is a National 
Audit Court whose inspectors exercise controls of the public funds (the local 
administration’s included) but also a Prime Minister Control Department whose 
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area of competence refers to institutions directly subordinated to the Government 
and also to other institutions. The creation of the Prime Minister Control 
Department hasn’t become an issue until its representatives started to exercise 
control at the level of local public administration units. In the same time, although 
its leader constantly advocated that the activity of the Department followed no 
other orders than the law, analysts concluded that its political role and influencing 
decisions are quite visible. Also, as Romania gets closer to EU, the fairness of the 
EU funds spending becomes a crucial priority for the Government. The Prime 
Minister Control Department has though direct responsibilities in supervising the 
EU projects implemented in Romania, being the OLAF contact institution for EU 
projects. A better definition and separation of roles of all these control mechanisms 
will be very useful, especially in the current legislation revising process Romania is 
going through these days. Talking about legislation, as it was, in fact, already 
mentioned in first chapter of the report, the Romanian legislation mainly covers the 
typical conflict of roles situations and institutes prohibitions (“incompatibilities”) on 
concomitant holding of jobs and positions. As far the local government is 
concerned, the most effective tool of enforcing these prohibitions is the mutual 
oversight of different, competing political parties represented in Local and County 
Councils. 
 
It is thus becoming crucial for the sake of the self-autonomy of the Romania public 
administration to have a clear description of the control institutions responsibilities 
as well as of their mechanisms. Controls exercised at the local level should no 
longer be interpreted as a “political pressure tool”, as very recent opposition 
parties’ mayors have complained about. 
 
Each local public authority has an internal control department and internal control 
procedures. Internal audit and financial control units of local governments’ 
representatives are in the best position to detect potential conflict of interest 
situations during their controls. None of these situations can be reported and acted 
upon if they are not explicitly defined as conflict of interest situations by the exiting 
legislation. 
 
Besides the internal control mechanisms, external financial controls exerted by the 
local Financial Control Departments of the Ministry of Finance cover only some 
aspects of conflict of interest situations. Their main responsibility is to prevent the 
bad financial management that might include, for example, the irregularities 
related to public procurement procedures and the use of public property for a 
personal interest. In the same time, a local authority is often visited by separate 
ministries’ control departments (such as the inspectors of the Ministry of Health, 
the Ministry of Environment or the Ministry of Transportation) if specific projects 
that fall into particular jurisdiction were implemented. Learning that it is not the aim 
of this report to describe the local budgeting process in Romania, one aspect is 
very important for the accuracy of the control mechanisms in Romania. 
Representatives of the Ministries control departments target the “special funds” 
expenditures (the funds that could be allocated from a respective ministry, in 
addition to a local authority annual budget; those allocations have a very clear 
defined purpose). 
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The National Audit Court plays one very important role in this context. Media 
reporting about the activity of this institution mainly referred to its control at the 
level of the central government. Still, the National Audit Court is exercising controls 
at the local level as well. Given the actual legal framework, which was rather 
tolerant toward various types of conflict of interest, the National Audit Court could 
not be very effective in exposing them. Unfortunately, the independence of the 
Court of Audit is periodically challenged by attempts of the ruling parties to 
influence the appointment of its officials (at the national level or for their local 
branches, such as at the county level) and even to use controls of the Court to 
intimidate or hassle local administrations run by representatives of opposing 
political parties. In the same time, because the number of local controls has lately 
increased, mayors who would prefer not to be visited by any control have publicly 
complained about too many “visits” of the National Audit Court.  
 
When in comes to the relation between the public institutions that are the most 
frequent involved in control activities at the level of the local public administration, 
it needs to be noted that both the National Audit Court and the Prime Minister 
Control Department has no legal basis to issue recommendations to individual 
public institutions.  
 
The Prime Minister’s Control Department has already been involved in control 
activities in a number of local communities (Bucharest, Cluj, Giurgiu). Its local 
implemented controls were highly criticized on the grounds of Local Autonomy 
Charter provisions. Also, those who criticized these practices referred to the 
Romania legislation, which stipulates that the Prime Minister’s Control Department 
area of competences mainly refers to institutions directly subordinated to the 
Government. According to the Law no. 215/2001, the institution that oversees and 
controls the application of law at the local level, is the Prefect. Consequently, the 
Prime Minister’s Control Department role is to supervise the control activity 
performed only by the Prefect at the local level (dealing with any local communities 
within the respective county). In this respect, the responsibilities of the PMCD 
should be further clarified so that no misunderstandings will occur about what 
other institutions than the ones directly subordinated to the Government can or 
canot control. 
  
One particular example could be very interesting to better picture the place of the 
Prime Minister Control Department in the whole spectrum of the control institutions 
in Romania. In December 2001, there was an ad-hoc politically generated11 
situation in the Bucharest Municipality when a control of the Prime-Minister Control 
Department identified a series of economic conflict of interest situations in 
Bucharest General Council. However one can consider this situation atypical and 
more relevant to the political dispute between the Government and the opposition 
Mayor of Bucharest, especially when taking into consideration that the PMCD has 
no clear jurisdiction over the local public administration. The involvement of the 
Prime Minister Control Department had an important meaning, its visibility raising 
the public attention on the subject. The role of this department in relation with 
other control units at the central government has been lately very disputed.  
 
The role of the Ombudsman institution is rather negligible in this respect although 
this institution has the legal basis for making investigations and issuing 
 42 
recommendations to the concerned institutions. In relations with other public 
institutions, the Ombudsman only takes action following citizens’ complaints about 
infringement of their constitutional rights by public authorities. So far no such 
complaints have indicated conflicts of interest as reasons for such infringements. 
 
The mission of such institutions (the ones exercising controls) is very delicate as it 
directly touches the topic of self-autonomy. Political interference in the 
administrative decision making process at the local level was very criticized both in 
Romania and abroad. Especially because such suspicious exists, the control 
mechanisms need to be transparent, well synchronized among themselves, 
coherent and well intentioned, in order to really prevent any potential conflict of 
interest and certainly to sanction the already existing ones.  
 
 
6. Accountability and responsibilities of local government officials for activity 
generating conflict of interest 
 
 
Attitudes of political parties regarding their representatives perceived as corrupt 
are not very coherent. In a first stage, the parties adopted a defensive strategy, 
trying to dismiss the reports of alleged conflict of interest/corruption as “politically 
motivated attacks”. When media and public opinion pressure exceeded a certain 
level, and the public image of the party happened to be severely damaged by 
association with such persons, the withdrawal of political support was more 
carefully assessed. In fact, there is no general rule, political parties’ decisions 
being influenced by complicated considerations of local clientelistic networks and 
prospects for political parties’ funding.  
 
As a matter of fact, the political parties do not have internal mechanisms (such as 
codes of conduct for its members) to deal consistently with conflict of interest 
situations affecting their members. This situation leads to a hardly predictable way 
of political parties’ reacting to corruption allegations and also explains the fact that 
political responsibility for misconduct in office is infrequently assumed through 
internal mechanisms but as a consequence of strong external pressures.  Still, 
some opposition parties have recently stated that, following the Bucharest Council 
economic conflict of interest scandal, they have asked their local members to 
choose between the public position and their personal private business. Their 
public statements were indicating that internal policies were in place in order to 
sanction further conflicts, one of these referring to sanctions such as withdrawing 
the political support and the person involved not being allowed to further candidate 
on the respective party list. 
 
While the responsibility of individual elected officials for engaging in activity 
generating conflict of interest is more or less clear to their voters, the Romanian 
electoral system (based on party lists voting) makes very difficult for the voters to 
prevent particular corrupt councilors from getting a new office at the next elections 
if their political parties do not withdraw their political support and remove them 
from the candidates’ lists. Mayor, who is elected through direct vo te, is more 
exposed to being accountable to the public but, as elections results have shown, 
the voters do not necessarily sanction mayor’ conflict of interest if they perceive 
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him as an efficient administrator of the community. The subordination of the local 
media makes public accountability even more problematic. Another expression of 
the mayor accountability to the citizens, the Law no. 215/2001 stipulates that a 
mayor could be sanctioned by being removed through a referendum. Reasons to 
organize referendum are more broad but could be applied to potential conflict of 
interest of a mayor and indicates that the law empowered the citizens with a very 
democratic set of tools. Substantial implications that organizing public referendum 
imply made this practice to be very rare implemented in Romania. The procedure 
can be initiated by 25% of the voters from that locality and the mayor is dismissed 
with the votes of 50% plus one of the voters. 
 
In terms of misusing privileged information, the legislation tried to prevent the 
abuse at all level of the public administration. The Emergency Ordinance no. 
60/2001 on public procurement provides for feeble sanctions of misuse of 
privileged information during the public procurement procedure (fines ranging from 
the equivalent of $150 to $1,500, applicable to both legal and natural persons) 
(Art. 98).  
 
Other forms of responsibility which to touch the area of conflict of interest, are not 
sufficiently regulated in the legislation. As repeatedly emphasized in this report, 
the Romanian legislation only covers prohibitions of holding public office in 
conjunction with other jobs and positions, either public or private (the so called 
“incompatibilities”, which means only a fraction of what is here designated as 
“conflict of roles”.  Usually such situations are easily clarified upon the beginning of 
someone’s public office.  
 
Finally, there are no forms of professional responsibility for local government 
employees in conflict of interest situations. Actually, the regulations on 
professional responsibility are specific for each professional body (such as medical 
doctors, lawyers, accountants, etc) that was interested in elaborating them.  
 
 
7. Other than legal instruments preventing conflict of interests 
 
 
As a general commentary, the simple adoption of codes of ethics is not perceived 
as an effective mechanism to prevent conflict of interest or corruption. Application 
of internal code of procedure/code of ethics certainly has a positive impact on the 
internal management of an institution. Sectors in their whole could act better if 
internal agreed regulations are in place. This explains why sectorial groups such 
as the public servants and even the local elected officials have drafted their 
specific internal regulations. How efficient these ones act, it is hard to say, but their 
role in the direction of a better management of the respective domain should be 
emphasised. 
 
Training could be another method through which to help the efforts aimed to 
prevent the conflict of interest. Education and training on conflict of interest issues 
will become more effective when a satisfactory legal framework will be put in 
place, which is still a task to be achieved. As a matter of fact, although the conflict 
of interest and its correlated other topics related to corruption is well spread, there 
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is still an incipient understanding about how could be better approached through 
training courses in order to some how prevent its further growing. 
 
On the side of formal education in political sciences and public administration, 
corruption related issues are approached in few courses and seminars. The two 
Political Sciences and Public Administration faculties in Bucharest confirmed that 
the topic of corruption and conflict of interest is approached only as part of a 
larger curricula on public administration reform. Class discussions and students 
interactions are very much influenced by the personality and the vision of the 
teacher. In some cases, that the coordinators of this study have researched in 
each of the two Bucharest faculties, its was clear that it is the teacher who 
interacts with the students on various topics related to conflict of interest and 
occasionally stimulates further researches on these topics. There are no courses, 
which to targets the corruption phenomenon, but it very often arises in class 
presentations and seminars discussions, one teacher has mentioned. 
 
Still, both Public Administration sections within the faculties in Bucharest admit 
that the topic need further attention and careful preparation along with the own 
teachers preparation to educate the students. The National School for Political and 
Administrative Studies has already made the first steps: one course on the topic of 
public servants' deontology is only one of the first concrete steps but there are 
other new courses yet to come. 
 
Later on, when interviewing the Public Servants National Agency about their 
training curricula and the on-going public servants' preparation, we have noticed 
that there is a consultation mechanism in place (although not systematic) between 
this institution and the two faculties in Bucharest. Similar consultation mechanism 
involved the faculties in the country. These consultations rounds were frequent in 
the past but they are presently suspended upon the inauguration of the Institute for 
Public Administration. The new institution role in the domain as well as its training 
arrangements in relation with other State and private providers is currently re-
dimensioned. 
 
No doubts that one of the most interesting presences in the public administration 
training area is the Institute for Public Administration - National Institute of 
Administration. Its role is to improve the public officials/servants skills and to offer 
specializations in their areas of interest. INA will train the future members of the 
public administration (at all level) - this training becoming one important condition 
for being accepted in a leading position. 
 
Legally established in the summer of 2002, IPA - NIA  (INA - in Romanian) is 
presently going through a very complex consolidation stage, many of its 
challenges coming from the still under elaboration curriculum and trainers portfolio. 
Another very important task INA is dealing with currently, is generated by the a 
required clarification role among other State former training providers as well as 
well as by the insufficiently explained final courses certificate role, a situation that 
has raised the concerns of the state public universities (especially in regard of the 
2 years diploma that could be assimilated with the public university master degree 
diploma). 
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Also, other challenges are related to the funds needs, INA' s largest budget share 
coming from the trainees' contributions, donations, and public budget allocations. 
EU funds are eagerly expected to help. Although INA is still in its early 
development stage, few preliminary notes about the stated services they will 
provide as well as about the operational structures could be useful. 
 
INA provides courses for the public servants body, elected and appointed official 
and "anybody interested". The duration of the courses differs from 2 years (this 
concerns the university graduates aged of maximum 30 years old), 1 year 
(accessible to public servants, elected and appointed officials of maximum 45 
years old), 3 months for the newly appointed local administrative units employees. 
At present (until the fall of this year when INA is expected to operate at its full 
capacity) the only courses that INA is providing last from 3 to 5 days. Training 
topics that were already provided varied from: PR, human resources management, 
management planning. Very often in the context of these trainings, the trainers 
were touching other complementary issues such ethics in performing a public duty, 
INA representatives mentioned. Other training topics are more directly linked to 
conflict of interest, as it is the case with the one on ethics and corruption 
prevention mechanisms at the local public administration level. 
 
The large majority of the trainers are "practionners" (as INA interviewed 
representatives have named them) from the local but, most frequently, from the 
central public administration level. Occasionally, INA involves foreign trainers. The 
already trained participants were local public officials (mayors, vice-mayors, 
prefects, county council presidents) as well as local public servants. As indicated 
by the INA representatives, courses topics were so far directly connected to the 
local public administration development in the process of European Integration. 
 
Attending the INA courses is currently optional but will become obligatory in the 
future, in the sense that graduating the classes is one major criterion to get 
promoted and criterion in each employee evaluation form. The future policy of INA 
will stipulate that any young graduated student whose plans are to join a public 
institution (at any level) should start his career by graduating the INA classes. This 
will become a condition to fulfil for all future civil servants leading position. 
 
It is the responsibility of the local units to cover their employees (participants in the 
INA classes) training related fees, 1% out of their human resources budget being 
specifically allocated to the personnel "on going" training, that INA classes is a part 
of. Thus, the participants' fees are representing a major, permanent financial 
contribution to the INA overall budget, the rest of their financial needs being 
covered by the State budget, EU and other foreign funded projects. 
 
INA  is replacing the former National Centre for On going Local Public Authorities 
Preparation, the whole patrimony being transferred accordingly. 6 regional 
independent centres are currently organized in: Bucharest, Calarasi, Cluj Napoca, 
Constanta (recently opened), Craiova, Iasi, Sibiu, Timisoara (recently opened).  
These 6 regional centres’ role is to locally promote and administrate the training 
curricula for the counties they are located, and for in the neighbouring ones 
affiliated to the regional centres. INA national headquarter is responsible for 
supervising the curricula and providing consultancy whenever required by their 
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local colleagues. There is no direct subordination between the central office and 
the local branches. Also, as a proof of the local branches independency, it should 
be noted that the offices curricula differs so that one local participant can choose 
between any local (or Bucharest based) training providers from within the network 
of the centres. 
 
Under the above briefly mentioned circumstances, the most important providers of 
training for civil servants in Romania so far, have been the non-governmental 
organizations and the National Development Agencies, but very topics 
approached were directly related to conflict of interest and corruption. In the end, it 
is important to mention the role that the NGOs have been playing in the last years, 
being the only trainings providers for both elected officials and public servants. 
Apart from the traditional training curricula on project management, PR, time 
management, etc, NGOs have recently started to train on other very updated and 
critical topics such as the implementation of the Law no. 544/2001 on free access 
to public information. The new anti-corruption legislation is expected to further 
improve the NGOs training curricula. 
 
 
Recommendations 
 
 
1. Elaborating the necessary framework to enforce the disclosure of the personal 
financial resources and assets. This information should be public. 
2. Designing more efficient training curricula to prepare a professional civil 
servants body. Supporting a better cooperation between the public 
administration and the education system.  
3. Fostering an institutional reform in the area of conflict of interests control by 
unifying the competences of all bodies in charge. 
4. Forbidding access to any civil servant position, for a civil servant that was 
disciplinary dismissed. This restriction should be imposed for a determined 
period of time (5 years).  
5. A more articulate cooperation between the public institutions with conflict of 
interest control responsibilities and the Trade Register Office in order to 
determine more accurately the economic activities that involve local public 
officials. 
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IV. Conclusions and final remarks 
 
 
Researching the topic of conflict of interest in Romania during the last months, 
gave us the chance to learn that there was not one single remedy for such 
practices in Romania but many that needed to work together. Conflict of interest at 
the level of the public administration in Romania has more and more become one 
critical aspect in the entire public administration reform process in Romania and its 
local public administration particularities even more important in the context of the 
present accelerated decentralization.  
 
It is hard to say which reason affects the current situation the most. Absence of an 
unique, comprehensive law on conflict of interest and the consequently 
perpetuation of the current sequential regulations, is one factor generating 
confusion, misinterpretation and ultimately a superficial application of the law. 
Because of the insufficient understanding of the terminology and the implications, 
regulations risk to remain superficial. At the present time there is no general law 
regarding conflict of interest, which remains an issue that is disparately and 
incompletely regulated by several pieces of legislation (Emergency Ordinance no. 
5/2002 on the introduction of prohibitions for local elected officials and civil 
servants, Law no. 215/2001 on the local public administration, Law no. 188/1999 
on the status of civil servants, Law no. 78/2000 on preventing and combating 
corruption). Moreover, the concept itself of “conflict of interest” is a recent 
acquisition of the legal, political and administrative vocabulary, it being 
predominantly used in the private corporate sector. As a result, the only species of 
conflict of interest recognized in the Romanian legislation is the most evident and 
non-problematic one, namely the simultaneous holding of public office with other 
private or public jobs or positions (“incompatibilities”). Therefore, regulations for 
preventing economic conflict of interest still are, therefore, only at their beginnings.   
 
Only after elaborating all principles in one unique law, sectorial regulations should 
be drafted in order to address all sectors particularities and expectations. Clearly 
stating the rules and the obligations should be the first priority for the public 
institutions’ leaders at all levels. In Romania, the content of procedures and 
internal rules are highly dependant on the provisions of the specific laws. As a 
general rule, there is a reluctance of the high public officials and managers to 
impose internal regulations that exceed the legally binding provisions.  This is what 
makes the general legal framework regarding conflict of interest extremely 
important but also gives little room for expectations that local institutional initiatives 
could outweigh the failures of the legal framework.  Following the legislation spirit 
and principles, institutions in different domains need to have internal code of 
conduct, applicable to their members’ specific activity. Equally important, if not 
more, are the recent intentions of the local elected officials to elaborate their own 
code of conduct (Codul alesilor locali) which to fit their particularity and to help 
creating a professional body of local elected officials.  
 
Inexistence of a unique legislation is definitely an obstacle for the institutions’ 
leaders in their efforts to build a professional staff, but the real efficient tool for 
them should be a good internal management. For that, each institution leader 
needs to know his staff and the organization culture, providing it with an internal 
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code of conduct which help consolidating the institution capacity to respond to the 
community needs in the most professional way possible. The internal code as it is 
needs to be complemented with other internal regulations, such as a human 
resources management strategy, a PR strategy, all in an effort to professionalize 
the public institution performance. 
 
Conflict of interest both in terms of legiferating it and implementing it cannot be 
dissociated from the rest of the public administration reform and, some people say, 
from the rest of the Romania society transformation. There are other very 
important areas such as the public institutions transparency (starting with the 
transparency of the decision making process) which need to progress following a 
similar timing. A comprehensive law on conflict of interest should be accompanied 
by other sectors’ revision, such as of the electoral system in order to more 
substantially empower the voters to sanction politicians’ misconduct. The political 
parties’ funding new regulations are expected to bring more transparency in the 
area of political sources of finances. Equally important is the enactment and 
adequate implementation of the draft law on transparency in the decision-making 
process, that will increase public scrutiny and the capacity of local interested 
groups to transparently influence the decision-making process. Another general 
regulation that could have a high potential for preventing conflict of interest in the 
area of public procurements is the Government Ordinance 20/2002 on electronic 
public procurement, presently concerning only the central government agencies. 
Enlarging its area of applicability will certainly bring more accountability at the level 
of the local public administration. 
 
In brief, recognizing that there is no single ideal solution to regulate the conflict of 
interest in Romania, the report has identified several options that policy makers 
could take into account before reaching decisions.  
 
Three possible ways of legislation have been identified and their respective 
advantages and shortcomings will be emphasized. 
 
A. Enacting a general law applicable to all (elected and appointed) 
holders of public offices and to all branches and levels of the state 
(MPs, public officials and civil servants in central and local public 
administration, magistrates, etc) 
 
The benefits of such a solution would be the unitary regulation of the conflict of 
interest and the possibility to rule out the risk of omitting specific categories or of 
delaying the adoption of regulations pertaining to specific categories. Its obvious 
shortcomings could come from the higher probability of neglecting the specificities 
of certain categories, which can bring about poor enforcement and inefficiency in 
particular cases. 
 
B. Enacting special laws for each category of public office holders. The 
exact nature of such special laws can vary according to each professional 
category: distinct special laws, or sections of special laws regulating the 
organization (in the case magistrates, Court of Audit officials, Constitutional 
Court, Government and ministries, etc) or the status of other categories 
(Members of Parliament, local elected officials, civil servants etc). 
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The advantages of this solution come from the possibility of taking into 
consideration the specifics of all particular categories. At the same time, its 
shortcomings consist in the likely omission of certain categories (especially when 
they are not numerically significant or they are able to push a strong lobby against 
conflict of interest regulation), on the one hand, and in the high risk of providing 
inconsistent solutions to similar situations across different categories. 
 
C. Enacting a general law providing principles and provisions which are 
common to all categories, that can be supplemented by subsequent 
special regulations whenever the specificity of particular categories 
require it. 
 
This solution combines the advantages and rules out the shortcomings of the 
previous two solutions. This is the reason why it is our main recommendation in 
terms of legislative technique as regards the forthcoming regulation of the conflict 
of interest12. 
 
Insufficient political commitment could be another or a separate reason of the 
present high level of conflict of interest in Romania. Drafting the legislation is very 
important, it creates the basis for the future actions to be developed but very 
crucial becomes the enforcement. The more complex the reform gets the more 
important the political will becomes. Development of successful public policies 
aiming at preventing conflict of interest in Romanian public sector continues to be 
a difficult task. The fundamental obstacle that has to be overcome is the still 
insufficient political will to build a fully professional civil service body, protected 
from abusive political control. A more definite separation of the political decision-
making and regular administration is still to be achieved, through legislative 
change at both constitutional and special legislation level. 
 
Talking about political commitment to enforce the necessary reforms, Romania 
was so far of no exception. Political will is interconnected with political firm and 
consistent application of the necessary decisions and obviously with a consistent 
political capacity to implement such reforms. The two different approaches, the 
one of the 1996-2000 administration and the current one, as regards the conflict of 
interest and corruption are different and for that matter, very interesting to 
emphasize in this context. Also, it is important to mention that some of the 
legislative initiatives of today were firstly raised before 2000, which would give the 
chance to underline the importance of political continuity such complex reforms 
would need in order to succeed. Some other legislative initiatives were of course 
new, in response to the developments of the phenomenon. Continuity is one 
important element for a successful reform in all domains and in the ones directly 
touching the political interests in particular. Still, there are also fundamental 
approach differences between the two administrations, whose short description 
will better explain the role of the political commitment. The 1996 - 2000 
administration stated that corruption was one very important priority. Strongly 
believing that corruption should firstly involve all actors in a community (policy 
makers and civil society) former President Emil Constantinescu personally was 
patronizing the anti-corruption campaign. Such committees were formed both at 
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the national and local level. Very ambitious, the distance between discussing and 
delivering concrete results remained significant.  
 
The less politically complicated Government elected in 2000 has also made 
corruption one very important priority to deal with at all levels. Drafting the 
legislation was the first step to address it, the Government recently said so that an 
almost 150 pages of text on corruption (and many other domains included) was 
elaborated in March this year. Being released only few weeks ago for the public to 
study it and make recommendations in 5 days (we will later explain the procedure 
and the reasons), the interested independent parties found impossible to deliver 
any analysis. Opposition parties were also concerned with the legiferation of the 
conflict of interest and corruption issuing their own bills. The National Liberal Party 
has its own bill (its approach being very comprehensive, drafting one single law to 
regulate the conflict of interest), so had the Democratic Party (with a more narrow 
approach, proposing different regulations for the central government than for the 
local one). Either way, the opposition have complained that their legislative 
initiatives were practically ignored by the current parliamentary majority. 
 
There are two main concerns regarding the current Government approach of 
adopting the legislation. 
 
First concern refers to the Government approach since initiating such law. 
Although civil society and the opposition parties have requested an open public 
debated on the bill, the Government decision was to take full responsibility (this is 
a so called “confidence vote” for a Government bill or a program which allows no 
time for in depth parliamentary debates; under such circumstances, the Parliament 
has two options: approve it or deny it - based on the majority of votes; successful 
denying means the that the Government is dismissed). This procedure does not 
give any room for debates on the content or the opportunity to issue amendments.  
 
The second concern is questioning whether the present Government procedure is 
constitutional or not. Despite the Government interpretation, the opposition parties 
have several times underlines that Romania Constitution doesn’t not allow a 
Government to take full responsibility on more than one single law (or one single 
program). Unifying 15 separate legislative acts under one single title: Law 
regarding some measures for ensuring the transparency in the exercise of public 
dignities, civil service and business area, on corruption prevention and sanctions, 
was perceived as a Government on purposely interpretation of the Constitution. 
 
Five new laws (transparency of budgetary debts, transparency in the 
administration and promotion of information and public services through electronic 
means, prevention and fight against informatics criminality, conflict of interest and 
incompatibility status in the exercise of public dignities and civil service and 
economical group of interest) and ten already existing ones are targeted to be 
amended through one huge Government legislative act. In an effort to target all 
implication of corruption, the Government also included laws that do not fit under a 
common purpose. Many critic voices opposed to this “legislative package” 
because of inconsistency between chapters, provisions and vague definitions. One 
strong critique was regarding the unconstitutional adoption procedure.  
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Speaking about the Government recent anti-corruption legislative approach, one 
separate and important observation is that the bill on the civil servants code of 
conduct was not included. There has been a continuous negotiation on whether to 
include it or not. At some point, it was decided to be included so that to regulate all 
dimensions of the public administration representatives but, all of a sudden, it was 
taken out. Talking about the civil servants, the secondary legislation related to the 
Law no. 188/1999 on the status of the civil servants needs to become an urgent 
priority. 
 
Predictions about whether the package will be finally issued to the Parliament and 
about what will be the future implementation trajectory are hard to elaborate.  
Effective implementation of the legal framework has always been a major problem 
for the Romanian public administration due to a generalized lack of administrative 
capacity, especially in smaller local governments13. Given that strengthening of 
administrative capacity is a priority of Romania’s EU accession process, any 
recommendations should take into account and correlate with the EU driven 
programs in this field, which are a major source of funds and technical assistance. 
 
When talking about political commitment, we need to underline that political 
commitment that really moves the reform should not be interpreted as a need for a 
political interference in the administrative decision making process. It is important 
to stress it especially in the current political environment in Romania, which was 
often suspected of the politization of the administrative acts. It is the justice role to 
take the necessary actions whenever conflict of interest or/and corruption occur. 
Justice needs to be independent and act accordingly.  
 
Admitting that the laws’ application is still one important weakness of the 
Romanian public reform and of the Romania society in general, the recent 
adoption of the anti-corruption legislation is then a very important challenge both 
for those in charge of implementing it as well as for the civil society whose help 
through monitoring the implementation, is very crucial. Elaborating the legislation 
and even implementing it, is sometimes not enough. Young democracies such as 
Romania is, needs to revitalize the civil society, consolidate its skills so that to 
constantly watch the application of the legislation at all levels and in all 
circumstances. Along with the legal and implementation procedures reform, the 
whole society needs to change, the public servant - citizen relation has to be 
modified, and so on, in order to really reach the consolidation of a transparent, 
corruption protected, democracy in Romania. 
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